

TSOCHO M. ZLATKOV

**Dynamism of Changes in Social Structure and
Intergenerational Social Mobility in Bulgaria**

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Author: © Tsocho M. Zlatkov

Edited by Petko Simeonov

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The analyses contained in this work are definitely a novelty in Bulgarian sociological literature, although some parts of them have already seen the light of day in Bulgarian. The novelty has two aspects. One is that this systematic analysis, in the form of a monograph based on four representative nationwide empirical surveys conducted in Bulgaria, encompassing a period of three decades, and focused on the interconnection between social mobility and social structure, is the first of its kind in Bulgarian sociology. A second aspect of novelty, one that concerns non-Bulgarian readers, is that it is published in English, an internationally accessible language, and can thereby reach a considerably wider audience and potentially popularize this analysis beyond the boundaries of its land of origin. It should be pointed out here that some of the analyses were produced a rather long time ago, a circumstance that has put certain limitations on the others, related to more recent surveys. In addition, in order to ensure comparability, I had to abide by the categories and other specific features of the oldest survey, that of 1977, and this has inevitably imposed a framework for the used information from the other surveys as well. Due to these circumstances, some of the analyses may have deficiencies in terms of methods; overall, I lay no claim to discovering new worlds as regards social structure or social mobility. What was most important for me was that it finally became possible to publish these analyses in English; thus, the few analyses that do exist in Bulgarian sociological literature on the topic of social structure and mobility have now become available to the international sociological community; this was the main objective of this book. Through it, I hope to decrease the large void in analyses of social mobility in the Bulgarian empirical sphere and in sociology in general. Apart from the analyses of the empirical findings, the empirical material contained in the work includes primary survey data, but also

two, three and more degrees of processed empirical material, especially in the form of synthetic indices.

In view of all this, I feel the book would be of interest for teachers and students of sociology, as well as for researchers in the field of social stratification and mobility.

PREFACE

The transition away from political and ideological totalitarianism – away from the characteristic organization of its relations, as an economy and as a military bloc, with the rest of the world – is of an unprecedented kind. It posed and is still posing many questions, for which historical science does not have ready answers. The changes involved represent a phenomenon of civilization.

Because of this and due to the lack of sufficient historical-sociological reflection on the past period, some people decided that the simple political erasure (a rather formal one in the Bulgarian case) of the previous system was enough to place the respective countries (and their societies) in new, equal conditions, which would permit sustainable advance. But as the start of the changes recedes in time, significant differences emerge between the various countries moving on this road; they are now placed in quite varying situations within the system of world division of labour and in global politics. The large lag of Bulgaria on this road has raised many questions in the last five years; some of the reflections on these questions have grown into permanent attitudes of mass consciousness.

The answer to the question ‘why this lag?’ is sought at several levels of Bulgarian sociology. Some believe the lag is due to the rigidity of society, provoked by a bipolar political confrontation. Others feel it is a direct result of the actions of incompetent politicians. Or a result of the application of inadequate transition models. In each of these answers there is some part of truth; but I think that all of them are, at least, not complete enough.

The inadequacy of the basic perspectives for explaining the

Bulgarian transition that have been functioning for years in public space, lies above all in the fact that these explanations have not sufficiently taken into consideration, or, for various reasons, have quite neglected, a circumstance that is particularly important from a sociological viewpoint, viz. the essential and specific sociological properties of the socium, modeled and inherited from the times of communist totalitarianism. These are above all the qualities of the social structure, or, figuratively speaking, the social pyramid. Here I am referring to the shape of this pyramid and also to the configuration and subordination of social-group agents, of consolidated societal links and interactions between these agents, which imply the functioning and reproduction of certain patterns of social inequality in society.

These inequalities follow and stem from the interconnected processes of building and crystallizing a certain kind of social structure and certain institutionalized patterns of real social mobility, which work as the transmission mechanism for bringing about certain changes in the structure, determining what particular kind of structure it will be. To trace the interaction between social mobility and changes in the social structure in a dynamic perspective, was the main idea of this work.

Before presenting the concrete analyses, based on empirical findings from sociological surveys, I decided, true to the above-mentioned emphasis, to begin with a first part (Chapter I), devoted to the particularities of the social determinants of the transformation of the system in Bulgaria; these particularities have predetermined to a large degree the course of changes since 1990 and, hence, the kind of processes of crystallization of new social stratification and social structure. Moreover, there is generally an insufficiency of such analyses in our specialized literature.

A more detailed view of these phenomena in our country would be of interest for foreign researchers of system transformations. For the sake of brevity, I will call this transition (the essential preconditions for which in Bulgaria will be presented below) 'transformation of the system', in keeping with the view that it is a process of all-embracing social change [Adamski 1992; Wnuk-Lipinski 1993, 1995; Grabowska & Pankowski & Wnuk-Lipinski 1994; Zagorski K. 1995; Zagorski

W. 1997; Mach 1998]. In reference to the ‘totalitarian’ social structure or state of society, I shall also use the term ‘real socialism’ in the sense of the terminological specifications made by Jerzy Szacki [Szacki 1996]; as for the subsequent state of society I will use the term ‘post-communist, post-totalitarian society’ or ‘transition society’.

The empirical basis is quite ample, so it is normal that there should be an emphasis on this sociological empirical aspect (it is a rare thing in Bulgarian sociological practice to have certain tendencies of social development in Bulgaria traced across four nation-wide representative surveys; and, as the Bulgarian variant began with a survey from 1967, the temporal scope has been expanded to over thirty years).

Presented in Chapter II are the idea, the main goals, and tasks for which the work has been elaborated, as well as the basic concrete theoretical-methodological positions that have formed my research approach to the concrete analyses of the mutual connection between social mobility and the changes in social-group structure. But before that, in this section, an outline is offered of the specific place of the topic of social mobility within the wider field of social stratification and inequality surveys: this is important, considering that the specific way in which the topic is situated is an issue often overlooked or not discussed explicitly enough by Bulgarian and foreign researchers.

As a result, all too often, the organic tie between sociological theory and sociological empirical data in this field is often weak, or at times entirely lacking. Together with this, I am aware of the complexity of such an undertaking and of the impossibility to offer categorical and definitive solutions here and now, to define firm, unchanging relations between the separate components of this field of study. In this part I have also touched upon the causes, factors, and functions of mobility.

An important place in this chapter is devoted to the development of this problematic and the empirical accumulations in this research field of Bulgarian sociology since the late 1960s until today. The emphasis here is on the missing or incomplete pages in the previous surveys (those before 1990) of social mobility in Bulgaria.

In Chapter III we first present an analysis of the trends of

development of the social-group structure at the macro level (five class categories) during the period in question. Then we examine the dynamics of the basic parameters and trends in the development of the processes of social mobility throughout the whole period. Here we also make an analysis of the changes in the social origin of the macro social groups and overflows taking place between groups: this mutual exchange of group members is one way of capturing the closeness between separate groups.

The second „floor“ of the empirical analyses is presented in Chapter IV, where we analyse the interaction between changes in the social structure and the processes of social mobility; here the goal is to deduce the direction and dynamics of the trends with regard to the following qualitative characteristics of social-group inequality: openness of structures and groups, evenness (or unevenness) of overflows between social-class categories, and the unequal mobility chances.

I should add that I am aware of the complexity of the task and the impossibility of providing categorical solutions here, of defining rigorous, unchangeable relations between separate components in this field of study.

Chapter I.

PECULARITIES OF DETERMINATION OF THE SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION IN BULGARIA

The breakdown of the communist system was such that a number of authors defined the changes in Eastern and Central Europe as revolutionary [Ash 1989; Dahrendorf 1989]. Essentially this has indeed been a revolutionary transition: a replacement of existing ineffective social structures and relationships by completely new ones. This has generated chain reactions of redefinition of the values, interests, strivings, and positions of certain social groups, strata, and communities, and the inevitable clash between them has brought forth political and social conflicts.

The „revolutionary“ act is important for our discussion insofar as it gave an initial push to the democratic process and, along with this, it predetermined the course and nature of the process. In the Bulgarian case the revolution began with a coup enacted by the more flexible and less orthodox lobby of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and this fact has determined the basic features of the ensuing changes. For this coup allowed the former communists to sit at the „Round Table“ together with the opposition: these negotiations legitimized the basic political actors and the bi-polar structure of the political space.

This bi-polar model, preserved even now, has been the first conflict-producing axis that has largely given political form to the social conflict, the issue being which political force is to accomplish the transition toward democracy and market economy. The round table negotiations in the Bulgarian context served essentially to give sanction to the presence of the previous elite and the persons chosen by it in the course of the transition.

The reforms were therefore initiated by a restricted circle of the elite, which was directly connected with the administrative and bureaucratic apparatus of the old state, and therefore carried out so as to minimize the infringement on the interests of these people.

The „endogenous“ model [Touraine 1982] of social change in Western societies has been replaced here by an „exogenous“ model of change of post-communist societies, where the active agent is the political sphere using the state apparatus as a basic tool for realizing the reforms. Precisely this orientation of the democratic process – from the political sphere towards the social base – constitutes the third basic axis of the social-political conflict in Bulgaria: that between state and civil society.

The reason for this is that the state apparatus has become a basic agent for realizing the social programme. This state apparatus, from the beginning of the changes and up till the present day, has remained overall intact (not only in terms of continuity of the cadres, but of the structure, the normative regulations and ways of functioning); this has proven to be one of the reasons why the fundamental political issues were not resolved for many years, which in turn led to quasi-reforms and half-hearted political changes without corresponding transformations in the direction of a market economy.

Together with this „revolutionary“ transition (and to an extent because of it), the second essential feature and predetermination of the changes has been the fact that the disruption of the Soviet System found the societies of Central and Eastern Europe more or less unprepared for the impending changes [Lendel 1994: 7]. Here is how George Soros comments on the initial period of these processes in Eastern Europe: „We have been surprised by the course of events, because we lacked the basic criteria for understanding them. A revolution is taking place before our eyes, and we don't even have at our disposal a theory of historical processes“ [Soros 1992].

This „abrupt downfall of Communism found the West also unprepared. Used to its confrontation with Communism and snugly nestled in its own superiority, the West remained carefree and self-assured, as if these were two different planets. It is now obvious that these planets were opposite ends of a single

indivisible world“ [Djilas 1999: 174].

Andrei Konchalovski remarked that the confrontation between the concepts of an open and closed society proved very convenient for both sides [Konchalovsky 1999: 150]. As many analysts point out, the West had the capacity of overpowering the communist system even before 1968. The West showed real interest in a change of the status quo only when the need for globalization of commodity and finance markets had reached a critical point. That is when the West undertook concrete actions for destroying the communist system¹. At the beginning of the changes, while giving moral advice on human rights, free elections and privatization, the West ultimately failed to grasp the nature and specifics of what was happening beyond the former Iron Curtain.

Hence the measures and assistance offered to most of these countries followed a much used pattern (for instance, a model based on the Polish case was mechanically transposed onto other countries without regard for the specifics of the regimes in these societies, hence without substantial results). The problem was compounded by the economic stagnation in the West itself and the crisis of the liberal system there.

But this is only one side of the matter. Our knowledge on real socialism, on totalitarian societies was not and still is not sufficient, and this is one of the causes for the considerable explicatory weakness of contemporary sociology with regard to understanding and orienting the transformation of the system in Eastern Europe. This is especially true for Bulgaria. In the range of totalitarian regimes Bulgaria is situated much nearer to the model of Soviet Bolshevism and hence falls in the category of countries where the tissue of social relations was more severely damaged by the totalitarian order, and where a heavier burden was left over from the past in all social dimensions [Zlatkov 1990; Zlatkov 1998].

We therefore need to go back and study even now as far as we can this kind of reality. Such retrospect always has a definite

¹ Information is extant, even coming from sources like a former British Ambassador to Sofia, that for this purpose the West began, starting from the 1980s, to corrupt the top ranks of the Socialist governments; it was at exactly that period that the debts of the latter toward the West sharply increased.

heuristic values for understanding the specifics of our transitions².

At the start of the 1990s, after the fall of communist totalitarianism in Central and Eastern Europe, all post-communist countries in the region were confronted with the same problem: which road of transformation of the system to undertake and what kind of capitalism and social development, generally speaking, to choose. The unprecedented historical transition from political and ideological totalitarianism, with its inherent economic organization and military confrontation with the rest of the world, posed a number of problems for which History had no ready solutions.

Because of this and because of the lack of sufficient historic-sociological reflection on the past period, some people decided that, with the political abolishment of the former system (a rather formal act at that), the countries and their respective societies in the central and eastern part of Europe were placed in new but equal conditions that would permit them to advance at the same pace.

With the lapse of time since the starting point significant differences between the countries have become apparent, which have placed them in much different positions in the system of world division of labour and of global politics. The large lag of Bulgaria on this road, has led in the last five or more years to a permanent questioning attitude in mass consciousness.

Why is it that our reforms did not succeed? [1]; what was the sense of the whole transition, when its end is still not in sight and it has turned into a string of frustrations in the personal lives of Bulgarians? Why did it turn out this way? Why did we turn out to be the failing pupils in Europe after our starting position in 1990–92 was relatively good? Why did the countries of Central Europe succeed, where we failed?

The answers to these questions are to be found at different

² Results from latest project „Social stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989“ approved this approach and how Trieman summarized about lessons from this project as first think that communism was not monolithic and further: „There were and *are* substantial variations across the six nations ... with respect to the level of economic development, the organization of education, and the dominance of the Communist Party apparatus. *What was distinctive about Eastern Europe was the dominance of the communist Party*“ [Treiman 1997: 243, my emphasis – T. Z].

levels. Some believe that all our problems were due to the social rigidity produced by the polar confrontation between political parties. Others see the personal incompetence of politicians as the cause. Or that the situation is a result of applying inadequate models of transition, an opinion expressed by a number of rather authoritative figures. We will not confront each of these opinions with reality. Obviously there is some truth in each of the them, but I believe all of them are at least insufficiently comprehensive. The explanatory insufficiency of these explanations stems from the fact that they all fail to take into account some essential sociological properties of the society modeled by communist totalitarianism and left as a legacy of the former regime.

The specifics of totalitarianism and the characteristics of the social pyramid inherited from that period. The legacy of the previous system consists above all in the qualities of the social structure or, figuratively speaking, the social pyramid. I am referring to the form of the pyramid and also to the configuration and subordination of the social agents, the consolidated societal links and interaction between these agents, which is a precondition for the functioning and reproduction of certain patterns of social inequalities in society.

These inequalities stem from the mutually connected processes of building and crystallization of a certain kind of social structure and certain institutional patterns of real social mobility, which precisely serve as a transmission for realizing certain changes in the structure, and eventually determine the form of that structure. The basic task of my discussion is to trace the interaction between social mobility and the changes in the social structure in a dynamic perspective.

Is it all due to specific characteristics of the transition itself or to some extra cause? Then again isn't this extra thing determined, genetically implanted by the difference in the forms of communist totalitarianism in this part of Europe and by the conditions in the societies, which overall have limited and predetermined the kind and speed of changes in each country?

The former socialist countries used to be called the „Soviet Bloc“, the Socialist Camp, thereby showing their unity, their sameness. The differences between these countries were ascribed

basically to the different economic starting positions at the beginning of „socialist construction“. In fact the differences were rooted in the characteristics of the totalitarian regimes in each country³.

No matter how similar the regimes were in their essential features of totalitarian communist states, with regard to a number of other factors – historical, socio-cultural, psychological and geopolitical (the duration of communist domination was also of no small importance) – the concrete manifestation of this totalitarianism in the separate countries had important specific differences and, more important, had different consequences for society.

The most elementary example is that the regimes of Janos Kadar and Nicolae Ceausescu are incomparable. The specific forms and functioning of the separate regimes determined the differences in the starting conditions of their societies, which in turn determined the character and speed of changes in the separate countries. It is not necessary to prove that the in-depth knowledge of these conditions is of great practical importance, and if this was taken as a necessary corrective tool, quite a few of our problems might have been avoided from the very start of the changes.

For our present analysis it is important to trace those characteristics of our society at the starting point of the changes, which influenced the specifically belated transition and consequently the continuing deformations of the social-group structure.

Before discussing the damages inflicted by the Bulgarian regime on society and the social structure, we should clearly bear in mind the differences between it and similar regimes in Central Europe (specifically in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, which are generally recognized as the most successful cases of transition).

In Bulgaria, we dare say, communist totalitarianism was much closer to its ideal model – Stalinist dictatorship – than were the other countries [Zlatkov 1990; Zlatkov 1992]. Ours was

³ That is why we cannot agree with what we consider to be naïve estimates of certain Bulgarian political scientists that with the abolishment of Soviet rule all these countries were placed in the same starting position for changing their societies.

a much more „Soviet“ kind of regime (one that much more closely copied its model and was much more directly subordinated to it) than those of the above-mentioned Central European countries, and this included the concrete features such as concentration camps and the physical and social annihilation of entire categories of the social structure.

Overall the Bulgarian regime was considerably more repressive than its counterparts in the Central European countries; it cut short any attempts at dissident activity. „The means of controlling the minds and will of people had attained an exceptional level of perfection.

This was the particular aspect of Bulgaria and Sofia that immediately struck me and left an imprint on my perception of the regime and of the effacing of the human personality that these methods had achieved: nowhere in the capital was there a trace of police or military“ [Fereira 1977: 21]⁴. „Here in Bulgaria, due to the longer and systematic crushing of minds and conditioning of people, there was no need [for the regime] to display force and power. The latter seemed to exist as if of itself, to be immanent to the regime, to a degree that I was tempted to ask whether it had not always existed in Bulgarian history [Fereira 1997: 21, my emphasis – T. Z.]. „The frightening lack of army and police in the streets was not due to the benignity or the virtues of the regime, but was rather the result of constant conditioning of the entire society“ [Fereira 1997: 58, my emphasis – T. Z.]. „The fact that we saw no police in the streets was not due to the lack of control in cities and upon citizens. The truth was that it was no longer necessary for them to display [their control].

All people knew the line to be followed and did follow the set narrow course of behaviour“ [Fereira 1997:59].

An essential circumstance is that, in comparison with the others, the Bulgarian regime was much more centered around a single person: it was headed by the same man for 35 out of 45 years. Overall, the isolation of the country was much greater, as was its break with the traditions and values of European civilization. In the whole time of socialism, of all its European

⁴ The author is a former ambassador of Portugal to Bulgaria; the comparisons he draws are based on his experience of Latin American regimes, especially on his long stay in Cuba.

counterparts, the regime here was the most dependent on and closest to the Soviet Union. As a result of this, the social fabric of our society, similarly to the Soviet one, was far more strongly affected by pathological deformations than were the societies of the socialist countries of Central Europe.

The most significant societal dimension of these damages, the most far-reaching and hard to overcome was the dehumanization of social, public and human relations and the greater the ensuing demoralization of all strata of the population. This was mainly due, in my opinion, to the following two circumstances, present in Bulgaria more strongly than in the Central European states.

First was the breach of continuity in the basic regulators of social order and of group and individual behaviour – law, traditions, and religion. The state took over more functions, and went on to regulate all social spheres. Religion was rejected and replaced by atheism (compare the role of the Church in this period in Poland). Traditions were pushed aside by the so-called „socialist system of rituals“ (even Santa Claus was replaced by „Grandpa Frost“), and law was turned into a basic means for legitimizing the domination of one social group over the entire society.

The second feature consisted in the rupture and destruction of a number of social ties, relationships and self-organization, and their replacement by a pyramidal network of artificial organization and structures (administrative and ideological, centralized and external to the individual's natural mode of organization) from the highest to the lowest level, which destroyed the normal interaction between groups and individuals and placed the personality in a strong psychological dependence.

Steven Fish calls this phenomenon „destruction of horizontal bonds between individuals and groups of individuals“ [Fish 1995: 22].

As an illustration of this thesis we may cite the analysis by Petko Simeonov, who in addition to the power resources of centralized governance such as the work salary, privileges, public approval and personal success, also lists the „powerful, and threatening means“: full information concerning the person, control over a person's important ventures, control over all

institutions, lack of public control over and even publicity about the actions of the centralized administration, secrecy about events and processes in society and the world [Simeonov 1991]. The state would restrict all initiatives and ventures of a person to strictly determined and controlled channels.

The basic means for achieving these two features was to bring about a loss of group identity and of social commitment and solidarity. As a consequence of the latter, there was a total devaluation of moral and legal norms. A strong degree of alienation and mass anomie set in. After the pyramidal network was abolished with the fall of the regime, a pyramid which was meant to structure and organize the social fabric under totalitarianism, these phenomena became manifest and flourished in different directions and forms: large emigration, growth of crime, the escape into quasi-social niches such as sects and nationalist formations (the latter proved to be not so much a product of the formerly suppressed urge for national identity as a substitute for the natural need for social cohesion).

Besides the mass anomie, some authors point out the blocking of reforms, the plundering of state enterprises, the slow course of privatization [Katsarski 1998: 79–96].

We agree about the presence of all these characteristics, but consider them to be a continuation of the processes of mass anomie in society during the socialist period rather than, as the author states, „a tacit compromise between the basic groups and strata“. It is important to understand that these processes and phenomena are stronger in those societies where the totalitarian regimes have been, generally speaking, stronger, such as the Bulgarian case.

The lack of a civil society in Bulgaria, a legacy of the socialist period, was also one of the basic differences between this country and the Central European ones, a difference that was decisive for the course of changes in this country. Civil society was considered to be a basic characteristic of the era of communism, but in the terms used by Bronislaw Geremek: a purposeful general programme for opposition to Communism, which emerged in Poland in the second half of the 1970s in the form of a mass movement of opposition to the Communist regime [Geremek 1996: 242].

The lack of such a tradition of mass opposition to the regime in Bulgaria proved to be the missing element, an element which in the Polish case proved to be the most useful resource. Here we should add the role played by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, quite the opposite of the Church's role in Poland: there it was a pillar of the civil society in its Polish interpretation, here it was an appendage of Communist power. Lech Walesa pointed out three main factors that brought about the downfall of Communism: the election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope in 1979, the creation of the trade union „Solidarity“ in Poland in 1980, and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The following step in analysis in explaining the appearance of processes of group disintegration, marginalization, and even *lumpenization* of the social-group structure in the transition, is to focus on the specifics of the social-group structure at the start of the changes.

The totalitarian social order, lasting for nearly half a century, was characterized by a specific kind of social inequality and system of social-group subjects and relationships. This system was marked by inertia, i.e. it would change with difficulty and slowly even when changes had taken place in the social basis that had produced it. The Communist regime, as any regime, could not simply float in mid air, in a social void. It needed a social basis of its own, and created it by producing a large salaried party apparatus, an overgrown state administration, and a large repressive apparatus.

Of course when social changes begin, the representatives of these groups can not change radically in mentality or behaviour. All the more so as, during socialism, they had grown into a „class for itself“ in Marxian terminology, into a stratum corresponding fully to the Weberian criteria of this category, the most significant criterion being the awareness of shared group interest and the presence of established mechanisms for realizing these interests. Here lies the asymmetry of social relationships: while in the context of changes one group would stand up for and realize its interest at all costs (that is why a considerable part of the changes were formal and imitative), all other groups were amorphous with regard to their interest; but even if some among them were aware of their interests, they could not uphold and

realize them, for they lacked the mechanisms to do so.

In this connection we must point out a sociological problem *par excellence*, that of the social reproduction of the nomenklatura in the decades of socialism. This question is part of the problems of the mechanisms and channels of social mobility under socialism. As Zygmunt Bauman defined with precision, in the Communist countries individual mobility was effectively „nationalized“, which means that the state held a monopoly over the allocation of social positions and personal growth [Bauman 1989].

In this way the normal reproduction of the elite through free circulation mobility was abolished, a circulation where the attainment of top social positions should be normally based on acquiring meritocratic attributes and falling out of these positions should be due to failure to meet the high requirements. This resulted in a devaluation of the quality of the elite under Communism. Gradually a career in the apparatus became the most attractive one for those who were not particularly capable but were strongly conformist; such people used ideological activity as a vehicle for rising to higher power positions, which in turn provided them with corresponding levels of privileges.

Another basic barrier to the transformation of the system inherited from the socialist social pyramid (one that was most often discussed at the start of the changes) was the lack of real middle strata (some authors consider that former intelligentsia played this role, but it is very controversial question) that should have served as a basis of civil society thanks to their social economic status, their interests and spirit of initiative.

The main question here is why such strata have not even begun to emerge in Bulgaria as they did in the Central European countries; is this merely due to the lack of economic reforms here?

In fact, our social pyramid was much more deformed under the former regime than in the latter countries. Here the middle range of the pyramid was wider due to the more pronouncedly Stalinist character of our regime, i.e. to nationalization, collectivization and coercive industrialization, which had practically deprived our society of any real private sector, of liberal professions and of an independent Church, factors that

played an important role in Poland and Hungary.

A step forward toward the formation of such strata should have been the restitution of property including of the land ownership, but the latter measures led to only meager results: the capital resource that restored property represented was small and poorly competitive; as for the land restitution, various groups of the former power impeded it in any way they could.

Besides this deformation of the social pyramid and the overweighing of its upper section, the collectivization of agriculture and accelerated industrialization, with its strong emphasis on heavy industry, brought about negative changes in the two main groups of manual labour, workers and peasants. Industrialization had pumped out the demographic resources of the Bulgarian village and the present complete restoration of land property no longer serves as a condition for the formation of an independent and efficient farming class (such a group can hardly be formed out of the few and elderly people remaining in villages, while the return of their descendants would be a complicated process). On the other hand there was a strong peasant element injected into the large cities and the working class, and a decrease in the qualification and of labour activity [Dimitrov 1984].

Moreover, the excessive concentration of workers around the large and inefficient enterprises proved impeding for structural changes. The shutting down of these enterprises and the ensuing unemployment of large masses of people was enough to topple any government, and this was one of the basic reasons why the Videnov government did not dare carry out the necessary structural changes in the economy, and why the following governments met with enormous difficulties in this respect.

Another specific feature of the social-group structure of the previous society, one particularly important for the course of changes and for the nature of social inequality in our country, was a result of the interaction between the political system of socialism in Bulgaria and the functioning of its economic basis. The economy was characterized by extreme centralization, total and uncontrolled state power over it, combined with a basic feature – the constant shortage of commodities that led to its being defined as a „deficit economy“ at the start of the 1980s, a

characteristic that brought about the „flourishing of cynicism and corruption“ [Mihailov 1991] and to social dimorphism [Wnuk-Lipinski 1993: 53–72], as well as to the emergence of certain social strata that operated a „shady“ economy even under socialism (economic, informational and other resources were taken and concentrated outside of public control; these resources now serve as a basis for the so-called incorrect model of transition in our country).

The last important consequence of the functioning of a given Communist regime is a dimension of social stratification and inequalities of society consisting in dependence; the more a regime is characterized by dependence of people, the greater the relative impoverishment of the population. Societies and people in the countries of the former Soviet Union, Rumania, Albania, and Bulgaria were already poorer in socialist times than those in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the countries of former Yugoslavia. The poorer a society, the greater its degree of *lumpenization*, of spiritual impoverishment, of the degradation of personal demands, and the larger its marginal groups.

Another basic, very important, significant difference between Bulgaria and the countries of Central Europe was the interrupted process, during the socialist period after the period of early industrialization – till the end of 60-th, of modernization, and even its reversal backward. Even if we assume that socialism is a kind of modernization of society, this would be true only with regard to the swift mass industrialization; beyond that the system acted contrary to the normal course of world civilization processes.

Here too Poland may serve as an example standing at one end of the range: as Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski writes, Communist Poland was farthest from the ideal type (in the Weberian sense) of a monocentric society [Wnuk-Lipinski 1993: 17].

The further a regime is from this ideal type, the more the respective society is open (especially to the exchange of ideas and people); this feature served as a precondition for continuing modernization in Poland, although at a slower rate and in other forms. Bulgaria (together with the Soviet Union, Albania, and Rumania) was at the other end of the range: here was complete political, cultural and informational isolation, lack of exchange

with the external world. All this brought about in our society a cultural and civilizational lag and even regress with regard to the condition attained before the establishment of Communist power. This feature leads scholars to generalize.

The Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka offers a good methodological scheme of the civilizational and cultural context [Sztompka 1994] of changes, a scheme that permits defining the differences between the former socialist countries that determined the subsequent nature and speed of their respective changes. This author points out that socialism had built a certain cultural syndrome of a bloc structure. Each society established its own means of adaptation to this cultural syndrome. The differences here were based on the different force of influence of the other three cultural contexts: the national, the regional, and the global.

As a counterweight to this bloc culture „Poland had strong national traditions, encoded in Polish Catholicism and preserved by the Church, and a greater openness than other countries to the world, a more liberal flow of ideas and people“ [Sztompka 1994: 14].

For Hungary the author sees this cultural counteraction to „bloc culture“ in the regional Central European tradition inherited from the Habsburg Empire“. In the Bulgarian case the situation was reverse: the regional and national tradition acted not as a counterbalance to bloc culture, but rather as a factor aligned with this culture and enforcing it in Bulgarian society.

The influence of bloc culture led to a complex system of values and corresponding features of social relationships and social activity at three levels, macro, meso and micro.

In addition to this lack of preparedness, which is now pointed out as a major cause of the difficulties of political and economic transformation of these societies, there was yet another feature determining the slow rate and the nature of reforms: the values of *homo sovieticus* have not disappeared here, although they are strongly undermined. I do not aim to describe this syndrome, but I must point out its present-day manifestations, which to some degree or other weigh down the course of current and future changes in Bulgaria.

Foremost there is a strong egalitarian attitude, in a crude

socialist form, which prevails over the minds of wide circles of people from various social groups and strata. The „infantile irresponsibility“, in Hankin’s words, permits people to live in a simple and clear world, to hide from the dreary problems of modern times, and ultimately proves to be comfortable and attractive for many people even today [Hankin 1994: 73].

The lack of European moral norms and cultural standards in the mass consciousness is one of the important causes for anomie in this category of countries, for the incapacity of people to orient themselves in the new conditions, for their „escape from freedom“ in Erik Fromm’s terms. This was an important cause for the way the reforms were conducted and the way capitalism started to be built in these countries; in general this has led to a great lag behind from the other former European ex-socialist countries; on the other hand, due to these ways of going about the reforms, an additional element of destructiveness was introduced with regard to social stratification and inequality, an element super-added to the requirements of reforming the economy.

Chapter II.

THEORETICAL- METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOBILITY AND METHODOLOGICAL PREMISES OF THIS STUDY

In Bulgarian sociology today there is an insufficiency of explanations concerning the difficulties of the Bulgarian transformation and the country's lag behind the former socialist states of Central Europe. This insufficiency is rooted in the fact that the prevalent explanatory schemes do not take into consideration a paramount sociological aspect of the situation: those specific characteristics of Bulgarian society that have been modeled and remain as a legacy of the period of communist totalitarianism. I am referring to the configuration and subordination of social-group agents, which predetermine the functioning and reproduction of certain patterns of social inequality in society. These inequalities stem from the interconnected processes of building and crystallization of a certain type of social structure and certain institutional patterns of social mobility which, precisely, serve as a transmission for bringing about certain changes in the structure and determine of what sort that structure will be. By defining these models of mobility we can better understand and learn more about the social whole in its concrete historical context. However, with few exceptions, studies of social mobility hold a marginal place in Bulgarian sociology. There is meager interest in this field and the specialized studies relevant to it are few; moreover, Bulgaria is still absent from international comparative studies of mobility. Hence there is a need for additional analyses of mobility, based on the available empirical data. I envisage establishing and revealing the typical mobility patterns of intergenerational mobility in the period 1977 – 1997. This period encompasses both the „further development“ of what was termed „real socialism“ and the latter's crisis and decline,

and, further on, the „revolutionary“ processes of transformation of the system and the „first 7 years“ of the new capitalism in Bulgaria. The processes in the two sub-periods were radically different, but together they have determined the crucial transformations of society. Hitherto my previous analyses have shown that in the first sub-period, up to the end of the 1980s, there were characteristic trends of decreasing mobility, of closing of groups and decreasing equality of opportunities for attaining positions: in other words, the trend at that time was toward an elitist society, the growing consolidation of structures, and the hardening of boundaries between groups.

The second half of this twenty-year period encompasses the years of the *perestrojka* and the first seven years of the revival of capitalism, the foremost characteristic of this decade was the considerable growth of social mobility mostly as a result of increased free circulation – the free movement of individuals between all categories of the structure. This was a period of decreasing inequality of opportunities and the opening up of most groups and of the entire structure. The radical change of trends in the latter half of the twenty-year period, as compared to its first half (the socialist years), involved changes in the mechanism for attaining and leaving social positions. We see that the structures of the two sub-periods, taken as a whole, possess the characteristics of social-structural inequality inasmuch as the latter decade was determined to a certain degree by the preceding one.

It would not be exaggerated to say that the social processes classified in modern sociology under the general term „social mobility“ have attracted the attention of social thinkers ever since the beginnings of social self-reflection. Regrettably, however, until the end of the 1980s, studies of social mobility in Bulgarian sociology, as in that of other socialist countries, excluding Hungary and Poland [Kolosi 1988], lagged behind international standards and did not correspond to the role they play in research on the social-group structure of society [Dimitrov 1988].

The lag was due foremost to the fact that the problem of social mobility appeared and developed in sociology within the paradigm of the functional theory of social stratification, which was in contradiction with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. Hence its relatively late and slow application in studies

of the social structure of Bulgarian society. This led to a lag in methodology and empirical research.

Either way, after a specialized statistical survey on social mobility conducted by the central statistical authority in 1967 [Atanassov & Mashiyakh 1971], indicators of it were present in all major national representative surveys on the social structure conducted mostly by the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The analysis of the data, however, was biased, the prime objective being to prove the ideological thesis of the approximation of classes and social groups under socialism. The basic aim in this report is to contribute to filling certain gaps in the international coverage of social mobility in previous analyses.

It is a fact also that they lag behind in certain areas, as a consequence, among other things, of the nearly complete absence of Bulgaria from international comparative studies of social structure and stratification until the late 1980s. This is why I have chosen to describe the processes of social mobility for a rather long period of time, the last two decades. I apply the established standard measures, well established in the international field, concerning the size, components, directions and openness of the groups and of the whole structure.

This study is based on data from four national representative surveys covering the period 1977–1997. The analysis as such is based on data from two surveys referring to two points in time within this large period: „Social-group Differences and Social-group Consciousness“, in 1990⁵, and „Bulgarians and the Economic Changes in the Country“, in 1997⁶; I was co-author in both. The secondary analysis⁷ of empirical data is focused on older studies: „Characteristics of the Population of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and its Social-Class Structure“, dating from

⁵ National representative sociological study of social-group differences and consciousness, conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences under the leadership of Krastyo Dimitrov, 1990.

⁶ „Bulgarians and Political and Economic Changes in the Country“, conducted in the summer of 1997 as part of the International Survey of Economic Attitudes programme (dr. Johnatah Kelley and dr. Krzysztof Zagurski), headed for Bulgaria by Tsocho Zlatkov.

⁷ This term is used in a broad sense, for here we are not repeating past analyses, but offering entirely new analyses of survey data.

1977⁸, „City and Village – 86“⁹. All these studies are representative on the national level for the Bulgarian social-class structure. All four points in time possess an interesting historical context, which will be discussed below. These temporal points form a dynamic perspective on an ample period of two decades, more than ten years of which passed in the totalitarian condition of society, while seven, in the period of transition from this condition to an open, democratic order of society.

1. The Place of Social Mobility Problems within the Sociology of Social-Class Relations

In this part I will attempt to outline the place of social mobility studies in the field of the sociology of social-class relations¹⁰.

It seems we must begin by discussing the place of the sociology of social-class structure within the system of sociological knowledge. As Krastyo Dimitrov wrote, this discipline is not quite of the same order as other sociological middle range theories, for it has a more fundamental and general importance and functions within the system of sociological knowledge [Dimitrov 1988: 71]. „Essentially the sociology of social-class structure is a specific ‘cross section’ of general sociology, which maintains the link between it and the middle range branch sociological theories, thus ensuring the unity of sociological knowledge about society“ [Dimitrov 1988: 79].

For its part „social mobility reveals the essential mutual connections between the dynamics of social-class structure and the changes taking place in the nature and conditions of labor in separate spheres, branches, and sub-branches of production, in the change of places and growth within productive forces, in the ensuing changes within the entire sociological structure of the separate types of settlements and regions“ [Dimitrov 1988: 70].

Taking into account that foremost in social-class structure are the regularities of the functioning, development and reproduction

⁸ A nation-wide empirical sociological survey of the social-class structure conducted in 1977 by the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and KESSI, headed by Krastyo Dimitrov.

⁹ A nation-wide empirical sociological survey of cities and villages, 1986, conducted by the Institute of Sociology at Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, and headed by Stoyan Mihailov.

¹⁰ I am aware of the difficulty of this venture and that its results are tentative.

of classes, social group, and strata, the interaction of their interests and behaviour with their social position, and assuming the following division of this sociological discipline at four levels:

- 1) meta theoretical;
- 2) general theoretical;
- 3) particular or middle theoretical;
- 4) empirical [cf. Dimitrov 1988 76–77],

it is safe to conclude that the place of the problem field of social mobility within this scale begins at the empirical level and reaches the general theoretical level; it is not of the same order as the other particular sociological theories on the separate classes or strata, etc., which make up the middle theoretical range of sociology of social-class structure.

Most probably that was what Mach and Wesolowski had in mind when they asserted that mobility analyses should logically lead to understanding the more general problems of the theory of social structure [Mach, Wesolowski 1982: 29] and went on to set the following requirement: „the sociological theory of social mobility should be part of the sociological theory of social structure of the whole society“ [Mach, Wesolowski 1982: 30].

But on the other hand the real picture of the development of this problem field is quite different. After the Second World War the intense development and important presence of these problems in modern sociology made of them the chief field of sociological searches [Goldthorpe 1989: 1].

This has led to the „abstract empiricism“ [Mills 1965], which can most briefly be defined by its focus on predominantly empirical manifestations of mobility, its search for and use of increasingly new research techniques for analysis of these empirical data, without commitment to more general and in-depth theoretical foundations and without advance to wider theoretical generalizations. In this sense the separate research approaches to the study of mobility, taken separately, narrow down the original problem field of mobility. In these approaches the researchers all too often deal with technical and specifically statistical problems of mobility research.

I fully accept the generalization made by Mach and Wesolowski that these researchers consign themselves to a non-theoretical level and to closure within the middle range of

knowledge [Mach & Wesolowski 1982: 41]. That is why I subscribe to the attempts, begun in the 1980s, at theoretical examination and at placing social mobility research within a more global theoretical and methodological framework.

By social mobility or social shifting here we will mean the process of change of social group affiliation of individuals; these groups are defined and set apart in the social structure on the basis of a socially important group of criteria. This process always passes, in one way or another, through certain social institutions. Oftentimes these criteria arrange the groups in a hierarchic order. That is why we take social mobility to be a change of social status of individuals and, in connection with this, a change of conditions and way of life.

In whatever way we define social mobility, two basic things are decisive for its meaning and importance: first, the basic concepts here are social status (or position) and social origin; second, the way in which the social positions of the respondent and parents, as already defined, will be determined empirically. These two circumstances are equally important and they are mutually determining. Even if we were to use theoretically and methodologically well founded categories of the structure, when the methods of their empirical definition are not good and adequate to what we are seeking, or, *vice versa*, the methods are good but the categories are badly constructed, the result will invariably be negative: in both cases there would be a discrepancy between the theoretical model and its operationalization, which inevitably leads to invalid results.

Social position refers to stratum affiliation, but various interpretations of 'stratum' are still maintained. Wesolowski distinguishes three most general meanings of stratum functioning in modern sociology of stratification [Wesolowski 1975: 85].

Adhering to this view, by 'social stratification' we will mean the process and the result of interaction of the basic three levels of the nature of labour as determined by the main levels of social division of labour, by the characteristics of the forces of production, by the basic relations of production, and also by superstructural social traits. The result of this constant dynamic interaction forms the real spectrum of social positions in society [Zlatkov 1988].

Of course, after this rather abstract definition, the next step towards concretization should be to define the concept of ‘social position or affiliation’. In this analysis, by social status we will mean the socio-professional affiliation of the individual, which reflects the connection of people to a definite macro-social function in social production and in the social reproduction process, to a definite type of labour, to certain conditions of application and realization of this labour, and, as a consequence of all this, to the basic material and cultural differences between people as seen in their specific conditions and ways of life. This is valid for the macro and meso levels of the social-professional structure of society.

Social origin, for its part, is essentially identical with social-group origin of the person; it defines the social-group environment in which the person was born, socialized and formed as a personality¹¹. The main role for the social origin of the person is that played by the social position of the family. This position, in turn, is mainly determined by the social-group affiliation of the person’s parents, which is used as an empirical indicator of social origin. The social-group environment always reflects certain economic and material possibilities and conditions of life; it is characterized by certain cultural, moral and ideological traditions and norms, behaviour patterns, and way of life. All this is primal and external with respect to the individual, hence social origin is, and is used as, one of the important synthetic explanatory factor traits¹². The comparison between the present situation of the individual and his/her social origin is essentially the basis of measurement of inter-generational mobility; here equally important are the coinciding and the non-coinciding of one with the other.

In any case the widespread use of ‘father’s social position’ eliminates the above-mentioned difficulties and also has a concrete methodological foundation: 1) in many cases the father

¹¹ In this connection I have presented my views in: Zlatkov 1996b.

¹² „The family actually plays a determining role in maintaining social order, in reproduction – not only biological but social as well, i.e. in the reproduction of the structure of social space and social relations. It is in the fullest sense the place of accumulation of capital in its various kinds and the transmission to generations: it preserves its unity for retransmission and through retransmission, in order to be able to retransmit and because it is capable of retransmitting. It is the main ‘subject’ of the reproduction strategy“ [Bourdieu 1997, my emphasis, T. Z.]

had an active social status, while the mother was a housewife; 2) even in cases when both parents had worked, due to the patriarchal features of Bulgarian society, the position of the father was dominant (except for the cases mentioned above), and 3) in many empirical studies the stronger connection between the father's and respondent's positions has been confirmed.

2. Causes and Factors of Mobility

In keeping with the understanding of the classical sociological thinkers that no human society has ever been without mobility, we may generalize that the causes for mobility are inherent to the very existence and functioning of society. Moreover, the historical development and advances of civilization have shown (and proven) that there is the scope and importance of social mobility in human history has grown; it is no coincidence that certain authors ascribe to it a particularly important role in the modernization of society [Porter 1968; Blau 1977; Zagorski K. 1984]. In this sense the search for causes of mobility will, to a great extent, provide answers regarding the functions of mobility.

Most generally these causes can be classified in three groups. In the first are the technical and technological development of society and the changes of production and economy taking place within it. Most generally, scientific-technological development brings about certain changes in the division and nature of labour, which leads to certain consequences: 1) a change in the ratio between various groups of professions, and hence in the social-professional categories; 2) the emergence of new professions; 3) the waning and disappearance of certain professions, and 4) the rising level of the contents of labour within a given profession (for instance a steam locomotive engineer and an electric locomotive engineer). All this naturally provokes certain fluctuations for individual and group professions, for social-professional and social groups; previously such changes were more typical at the inter-generational level, but recently they have started to occur within the one and the same generations.

Different in type are the societal causes external to the individual, but connected with restructuring of the social-class structure due to political factors *sensu stricto* (these will be

mentioned further below). This includes economic actions that are a result of political and/or ideological views and decisions. Thus, for the period on which our empirical analysis is focused, one political and economic elite was deposed and replaced by another, and certain social groups and classes were eliminated from the social scene (for instance cooperative peasants or the party nomenklatura), and new groups appeared. We may even risk the generalization that during the entire socialist epoch in Bulgaria, this politics-related and ideology-related category of causes was predominant over the others¹³.

The third group of causes is demographic in nature: the differences in birth rate and mortality of certain social strata. For instance the biological overproduction of a high stratum and/or the insufficient reproduction of a low stratum may be a precondition of downward vertical mobility; and, vice versa, the insufficient reproduction of high strata under certain circumstances of production and economy may lead to social upward movement.

Another category of causes is connected with the modernization of society *par excellence*. For instance the rejection of certain religious norms and of caste divisions by secular legislation is a factor that unleashes mobility in certain countries.

A fifth kind of factor is related to the micro level of society, to social psychological mechanisms. The striving to improve one's situation, hence one's self-esteem and how one is estimated by others (which, essentially, is social prestige) is characteristic for all people in societies that have emancipated themselves from religious and ideological prejudices regarding the structure of society and, more specifically, regarding the social scale. Of course, the motivation to achieve success by rising in society is strongly differentiated in social-cultural terms. The norms for success are specific to societies and to different segments within the social-group structure. Some additional factors working here are related to the individual personality, especially individual aptitudes and ambitions, and also to the moral status of the

¹³ Even in recent years, developments in Bulgaria have once again vividly demonstrated how, by using political mechanisms, certain categories previously connected with the totalitarian regime, can rapidly become economically and financially successful and reach the top of the social pyramid; thus under the new principles and mechanism of construction and functioning of economic life, specifically of property, these people have become a new and powerful capitalist class.

individual: the desire for success at all costs regardless of the means for achieving it often involves compromises with one's conscience and disregard and violation of general moral and legal rules. When discussing the causes of social movements at this individual level, we must not overlook those connected with random biographical events (social entropy is inherent to all societies, but its scope cannot be precisely traced). Oftentimes some event in the life of a person proves decisive, an event that we may define in terms of chance or luck – good or bad; all other things being equal, these events stand out and justify the assertion that someone has been lucky or unlucky in life.

When examining and taking into account the factors of social mobility, we must have in mind certain methodological particularities.

The *first* is that they never operate separately: they are always interwoven in some way that is specific to different individuals and to the various stages in the life of one and the same person (of course this is true in cases of uniformity of societal conditions).

The *other very important particularity* is connected with the structural or macrosocial factors. As Kryasto Petkov correctly points out, there is „the resultant force characteristic for them, and in this kind of studies it is necessary to put them outside of brackets, for they cannot be measured and described adequately at empirical level. The only correct methodological solution in this case is the in-depth knowledge of the global processes in production and in society, to seek and reveal (following the path of logic) their impact on mobility“ [Petkov 1986: 364–365].

Another fact that we must note here is present in many empirical analyses: the notion of ‘factor’ is applied either to the institutions (channels) of mobility (they will be discussed further below in this paragraph), or to indicators of social position; the operationalization of the mentioned social processes generating social mobility is not undertaken. As a result, the connections of cause and effect are often confused, and unjustified or false conclusions and generalizations are inevitably made as to the real functioning and consequences of social mobility.

The next general question regards ‘channels of mobility’. By this term we mean most generally the social institutions for selection and rise of individuals in society, and hence for the

realization of mobility chances. Foremost among these is the family. Its role for social mobility has been the object of numerous analyses. Family capital in its three dimensions – economic, cultural, and social (connections and ties) – plays a considerable role even in modern societies for the distribution of individuals among the various social positions.

Marriage is another very important social institution; it has been traditionally used in history as a mechanism for rising in society, as a means to compensate for the lack of some kind of family capital in one of the partners or for opening blocked channels such as those of education and profession. This prevalently refers to women, for traditionally men tend to have a higher status than women. Our society in the recent past offered more than enough examples of such blocking of channels. That is why upward mobility through marriage is particularly important at the individual level and the level of everyday life. Strangely enough, sociological studies of mobility have not drawn sufficient attention to it, whereas in literary fiction and the cinema these phenomena have a guaranteed place, and a considerable one at that.

The next important channel, traditionally taken into account by sociologists, is schooling and, more generally, educational institutions. They are the transmission between human resources on one hand and the total needs of society for professionally qualified people. Because of this, a functional requirement of contemporary society is the presence of a relative equality of opportunities for achieving higher educational levels, and the degree in which this really occurs indicates how modern and developed a society is.

Another institution of selection and distribution along the cells of social-professional structure is profession. Selection here has three dimensions: the recruitment mechanisms for a profession; the change of profession; and movement along the professional scale. Relevant to this are professional organizations (trade unions, etc.), membership in which often promotes professional upward mobility.

Still other institutions serving upward professional mobility are political organizations, religious communities etc., which in some types of societies are especially important as social

‘elevators’.

3. The Civilization Function of Mobility

The functions of mobility are closely connected, as mentioned, with the factors that cause it. In our assumptions about these functions we adhere to the views of the Polish sociologist Bogdan Mach (1989). This approach cannot be classified under any of the major paradigms; rather it combines neo-functionalism with a specific version of the theory of social action. This conception directly corresponds to some versions of humanistic system analysis. This should not surprise us: as the author wrote, „today in theoretical works the borderlines between orientations become increasingly vague, and the arising conceptions increasingly combine in a creative way components of approaches that traditionally stood very far from one another“ [Mach 1989: 68]. Mach distinguishes three main functions of mobility: structural opening, effectiveness, and integration. In my opinion, we may add one more, which we will call the ‘civilization function’ of social mobility.

The traditions of social self-reflection on the growth of the social system are highly differentiated by the civilization-culture framework of these circles of social philosophies. I accept there are two extreme poles of the continuum of these circles¹⁴: the Mediterranean one, which later evolved into the circle related to European civilization and culture, and that of Ancient India. In seeking to know what determined the possibility for the first of these circles to develop and eventually become the basis of modern civilization, while civilizations like the latter, despite their great cultural accumulations, were not able to determine the global development of human civilization, I believe the ultimately decisive factors were two, stemming from the features of the bases of the respective societies (here we will not consider natural climactic, geographical or other determinants of development). These were a) the openness to foreign cultural influence and exchange, and b) the potential for having and accelerating social mobility in a historical aspect.

¹⁴ We do so with due regard for the relativity and simplification of this view; further below we will see the basic idea lying behind this opposition.

In my view, one of the main imperatives of social development and the advance of civilization is the enhancement of social mobility processes. Where these are lacking there is stagnation of civilization¹⁵. Social mobility here is a motor of social development: it is indisputable that across the separate stages of development of European civilization, starting with the society based on slavery, passing through feudalism, and capitalism, and down to post-modern society, the movement has always been from a lesser level of mobility, connected with considerable obstacles to mobility, to an increasingly intense and unimpeded mobility. Things have reached a situation in our time when a great variety of preconditions have been created for liberating mobility, whereby the aptitudes and talents contained in a society can be amply (perhaps even fully) used.

In examining cases of social and economic „booms“ (e. g. the development of Dutch capitalism, the French Revolution, the American Revolution, and the subsequent economic development there) we see that in all cases processes of „unleashed“ mobility were present: mass and intensified movement of individuals across social groups occurred and the emergence and growth of new social groups was not impeded. The United States are especially characteristic in this respect. That is why Alexis de Tocqueville focused special attention on this country, trying to deduce the fundamental feature of American democracy and of development in general, and specially emphasizing the role of free mobility in this respect [Tocqueville 1976]. In his view the fundamental characteristics of democracy, unlike those of aristocracy (for him, these were the two opposite poles of political order), were the freedom to occupy different positions in society without regard to privileges (without reserved places for representatives of certain orders or strata) and the lack of sharp dividing lines between groups. He considered the equalizing of social chances to be a basic factor for the change of customs and attitudes towards democracy. His views remain meaningful today.

It is no coincidence that, in discussions of the functions of

¹⁵ Caste division in Ancient India (which is still preserved today to a considerable degree) is sanctioned by religion; it precludes social mobility, and this sets a fundamental obstacle to the overall development of society. An example from more recent times is Japan: its accelerated development dates from the times when it opened to the influences of European civilization.

mobility, the formation and functioning of elites is a recurrent topic. In presenting the civilization function of mobility I would also refer to the views of Mannheim regarding the formation of elites in the liberal society [Mannheim 1974: 124–138].

In order to further trace this context I also use the views of Stanislaw Ossowski, who holds that the democratic organization of society aims above all to abolish the system that provokes permanent stabilization of cultural and governing elites and to create conditions that promote as free a selection as possible of elites. In other words, these are conditions where the participation in the active building of culture, where occupying positions of leadership in public life, depend only on personal activeness, aptitudes, and moral qualities of individuals; moreover, social roles should be open in the same way to all social strata [Ossowski 1968: 333].

Our discussion so far permits us to generalize: the freedom of social movements between social groups, movements based on the above-mentioned selection criteria, the possibility to attain higher social positions, the lack of political, legal, economic, and other obstacles to mobility, are some of the basic criteria for defining a developed and democratic society.

4. The Bulgarian Experience and Blank Areas in Analyses of Mobility in the Socialist Period

Over the last two or three decades of the socialist period a considerable amount of empirical data and analyses have been accumulated in our country with regard to the processes of social mobility in Bulgarian society. In chronological order, the first statistical observation dates from 1967 [2]; it was summed up by Atanassov and Mashiyakh [Atanassov & Mashiyakh 1976]; on the basis of concrete statistical observation of the entire social structure, the authors characterized the process of reproduction of macro-social groups.

The basic questions that were given an empirical answer in this research were: where did the then existing social groups come from, and what were their roots in terms of social-group origin? The chief shortcoming of this observation was that the distinction between the basic macro-social groups (workers, peasants, and

employees) was not based on strictly sociological criteria, and in the general category of „officials“ (synonymous with civil servants, employees), the sub-group of the intelligentsia was not differentiated [Petkov 1986: 349].

The problem of social mobility at the macro-level found a place in the study on „City and Village“, conducted and headed by Professor Zhivko Oshavkov [3], an epoch-making research in Bulgarian sociology for its time, and basically an attempt at empirical verification and application of the concept of sociological structure of society [Oshavkov 1976]. Yet in the subsequent analyses of this data base, the problem was given a minor place, among other reasons, because the starting point in time for registering social mobility was set at a given date – September 9, 1944, formally considered the start of the socialist era, so that a confusion of inter-generational and internal generation aspects of social mobility resulted [cf. Dimitrov 1976].

Next in chronological order, Minko Minkov in his study of labour resources in the early 1970s examined the processes of social mobility in terms of reproduction of the main classes; leaning on statistical data, the author traced the link between migration from village to town and the social-group recruiting of the basic classes [Minkov 1976: 352–355].

In the first specialized study of social-class structure in contemporary Bulgarian society, conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 1977 [4], special attention was given to the indicators registering the processes of social mobility at the macro-level; here changes in the social position between generations as well as within generations were examined. Most noteworthy was that this study divided the entire population of the country into four groups according to the time of the start of the work career, which facilitated the projection of the basic tendencies in mobility according to the specific features of the period ranging from 1944 to 1977. These analyses made a valuable extension in the scope of examination: not only social-class but social-professional mobility was considered. In addition, the impact of education and qualification mobility on the intensity of social-group changes was taken into account [Petkov 1986: 349–389].

In the following major national study conducted by the

Institute of Sociology, „City and Village 1986“ [5], indicators for the two types of social mobility were used at the level of socio-professional groups (numbering in all 13). This information was treated as part of the social-group characteristic of the respondents. It was not analyzed thoroughly enough, for it was not defined as a separate research topic in the analysis.

In 1990 the Institute of Sociology again carried out a survey, unique in many respects, on social-group differentiation [6] [cf. Dimitrov & Zlatkov 1994]. The path-breaking feature of this work for Bulgarian science was its search for the link between objective measurements of social status of groups and the super-structural, psychological characteristics of the persons comprised by the groups. Moreover, for the first time a new way for determining social-group affiliation was applied, an approach in line with the contemporaneous international standards. In the research report on the study, the mobility between generations and within, both at the macro and meso level, was viewed as a mechanism of social inequality [Zlatkov 1994].

The problems of social mobility in Bulgarian empirical sociology of the 1970s and 1980s were present at the level of study of separate social groups and categories. Here we should mention foremost the international comparative study on the engineering and technology intelligentsia and the industrial workers of the former socialist countries [7]. The analysis was concentrated mainly on ascertaining the similarities and differences in social reproduction of the four surveyed groups (two groups of workers and two of intelligentsia) for the six countries taking part in the study (German Democratic Republic, People's Republic of Bulgaria, Polish People's Republic, USSR, Hungarian People's Republic, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) with regard to the social convergence between the groups. Notably, social origin was assumed to be a factor both for social differences and for acquiring qualification, as well as a factor for cultural and political activeness [Lecz & Ossipov & Harvat 1985]. The following study in which our topic was well-covered was the comparative study of the student category in five socialist countries; Bulgaria was represented in the research team by the Institute for Investigation of Youth, headed by Peter-Emil Mitev [8]. The mobility data was viewed through the prism of social

sources for the formation of the group of students, these sources comprising both the origin in terms of the nature of labour performed previously and according to the education of the parents, the territorial place of origin (city, village, size of the settlement of origin), and the place where the secondary education of the respondent was completed [Mitev & Filipov 1982]. Also in the framework of collaboration between the five socialist countries (PR Bulgaria, German DR, Polish PR, USSR, and Czechoslovak SR), a study was conducted of young people occupied in the branches of industry and the service spheres connected with industry. The information for Bulgaria was gathered in 1978 [Shubkin, Gospodinov, Gazho 1983]. In this research special attention was devoted to the study of social mobility of young people in the inner-generational and inter-generational aspects. Along with this the influence of social institutions – marriage and the educational system – on mobility processes among young people was analyzed [Shubkin, Gospodinov, Gazho 1983: 278–341].

In 1985 a team of young sociologists carried out a survey of workers in the leading branches of industry [9]. This analysis of mobility was noteworthy for the fact that inter-generational social mobility was traced both on the father's and the mother's side of the respondents. Besides inter-generational mobility, the potential mobility was examined, as reflected in the desire for change of profession and social position [cf. Zlatkov 1988].

Another separate and not inconsiderable section of Bulgarian analyses of social mobility is comprised of secondary analyses of the empirical data already gathered in the above-mentioned studies. These analyses have been the fruit of the research interest of what may be called a „new young wave“ of researches in the field of social structure and stratification. The first example of this interest was the examination of data on the convergence of working class and intelligentsia in industry, focused on the social-professional inter and inner generation mobility in the framework of blue-collar professions, which were structured in seven social-professional groups [see Kostova 1984]. Next came a series of analyses by Molhov and Zlatkov [1986, 1991] in which, using empirical data from surveys dating from 1967, 1977, and 1986, the correlation between social structure and social mobility was

examined using Harvat's model. The following research on the topic, also based on data taken from these three studies, was focused on the social sources and the reproduction of the working class [Bobeva 1989]. In this analysis the topic of social-group mobility was in fact included in the examination of social-class sources and the role of the family origin of workers in separate points in time.

Regardless of the achievements of these analyses, conducted mostly in the second half of the 1980s, overall the study of social mobility in Bulgaria was, as Krustyo Dimitrov writes, „unsatisfactory, not adequate to the great importance the study of it has both for the theory of reproduction and development of social-class structure of socialist society and for the practical regulation of social and social-class relationships and contradictions“ [Dimitrov 1988]. Moreover, the existing analyses were marked by certain ideological imperatives regarding social structure, which were bound to prove: 1) the superiority of mobility under socialism (its high rate, its freedom, etc.) over that of bourgeois society, and 2) its role in establishing social homogeneity of socialist society.

Ultimately the problems of social mobility in our country lagged and remained underdeveloped both in their methodology and empirical data accumulation. But this was characteristic not only for Bulgarian sociology. As the noted Hungarian sociologist Tamas Kolosi put it, except for Poland and Hungary, in all the other socialist countries „a considerable lagging behind occurred, by international standards, in the study of mobility“ [Kolosi 1988: 6].

For researchers working within this problem field, these words point to the fact that in the Bulgarian case specifically, there were no or hardly any studies of the mechanisms and scope of social inequality in Bulgarian society; and it is well known that social mobility is one of the processes which most exactly reflect the distances and inequalities between social groups and between the social positions in the overall social hierarchy of society. „As an indicator of the life careers of individuals, it [social mobility] predetermines the patterns for ascent or descent in the social hierarchy, which decides one's place in the class-stratum structure, access to goods and offices, and also determines other

life opportunities. Viewed in a global perspective, the patterns of mobility appear as the result of class barriers which stabilize the existing system of inequality and, contrariwise, may be a factor for decreasing the firmness of social divisions in situations when the intensity of inter-generation streams between class-stratum segments increases“ [Sawinski & Domanski 1986: 1].

Besides the shortcomings of approach or methodology alluded to and the insufficiency in empirical data accumulation, the capacity and results of studies of social mobility were strongly determined and restricted by the concrete reality of the communist period in Bulgaria. I feel it is necessary to examine the phenomena and processes that could not be officially highlighted by studies of mobility in that period but which, to a great degree, determined the character of mobility.

The problem field of social mobility was introduced in sociology above all thanks to the search for new approaches and ways of studying and analyzing the changing social structure. The latter in turn was a result of specific theoretical views on society stemming from the functionalist theory of social stratification, and as this theory was presumed to be something „bourgeois“, the attitude toward it in our country was bound to be negative.

Thus this field was at first stigmatized (following Soviet practice) and not tolerated on the territory of social science here. Gradually and chiefly due to the fact that sociology of social stratification and mobility had won stable footing in some countries of the communist bloc (mainly Hungary and Poland), it began to develop in Bulgaria as well. But time had already been wasted and this field of research ultimately remained underdeveloped and lagging both in methodology and with regard to empirical accumulation. „Particularly in Bulgaria, in the context of the overall inadequate development of social class structure research, there is a particularly severe shortage of theoretical work and empirical material regarding the group and individual movements between classes and within classes“ [Petkov 1986: 383, my emphasis – T. Z.]. As an illustration of this we may point out that in specialized Bulgarian publications by the mid 1980s the works devoted to social mobility (excepting the topic of migration and fluidity of labour) can literally be counted on the fingers of one’s hand [Markov 1966; Polyakova 1966;

Livio 1969; Todorova 1972; Petkov 1981; Parchev 1984].

Another significant lag in the sociological study of this field, especially with regard to the two aspects mentioned above, is the non-participation in international theoretical and comparative empirical studies (especially in partnership with Western sociologists), which inevitably contributed to the lagging behind in the field; unlike Bulgarian scholars, Polish and Hungarian sociologists can point to a number of studies [Wesolowski & Slomczynski & Mach 1978; Meyer & Tuma & Zagorski 1979; Allardt & Wesolowski 1978; Andorka & Zagorski 1980].

In addition, the place of this topic in research was granted mostly in order to confirm the assumed difference between the social mobility processes in Bulgarian society and those in bourgeois society. The study of social mobility had to unfailingly pass through the filter of ideological tenets such as „the complete openness of society and social groups“, „lack of obstacles to mobility“, „convergence of social groups and progress toward complete social homogeneity“, etc. It should be emphasized, however, that in the last years preceding the end of the socialist system our sociologists succeeded in minimizing the effect of this filtration (as indicated by the existence of the above-mentioned surveys and analyses). The gradual emancipation of this discipline from communist scholasticism (and this observation can largely be extended to our entire sociology) did not begin with the end of the communist order. Today it is urgent for researchers to present and interpret the facts as they are, without half-truths and allusion, and without the accumulated ideological ballast.

That is why we must add pages that were never written in previous analyses of mobility in Bulgaria. This is exactly my intention. I do not mean to revise everything that has been said on the topic, nor to make a secondary analysis of the entire empirical material gathered in the past; which is neither necessary, nor possible for a number of reasons, the foremost being methodological but also social-political. It is not possible to restore the full real picture of mobility using the empirical material of that time, due to the highly restricted research field at the time both with regard to the object (especially the taboo on obtaining information about the governing party nomenclature and high ranking state officials, and even more the impossibility of

studying this category using sociological methods)¹⁶, but also with regard to the topic (a certain sphere of questions was excluded a priori in the tools). Moreover, under the previous political and ideological conditions, many issues connected with a person's social origin were perceived by people not only to be touchy but even dangerous (previous studies have shown that a considerable part of the respondents would conceal their origin if they considered it „inappropriate“ by official standards).

Our socialist revolution, just like any forcible intervention in public and social order, thoroughly altered the ordering of social groups and strata. In a matter of several years whole social groups such as the bourgeoisie, the middle strata (which are justly considered the backbone of civil society) and the typical intelligentsia were physically and socially destroyed to a great degree. Their representatives underwent a forcible downward social mobility and for a long time remained at the social bottom. For people coming from these groups, not only the previous channels for social growth were lost, but even the possibility for using the new channels was blocked. Their previous high positions in society were quickly occupied by people loyal to the new political doctrine. In the sociological study of the field, this phenomenon is called social rise (or advancement) based on non-meritocratic criteria. In this way the top of society was occupied by people who often lacked the needed qualities of a social elite. This group gradually closed itself up and formed a stratum corresponding fully to Weber's criteria of such [see Weber 1975: 420–422]. On the one hand the group controlled all channels of mobility, on the other hand, its representatives had created and reserved for themselves channels of their own for occupying the high social positions; still more, they had reserved the best pieces of the „pie“ of social positions for themselves, and no one outside this stratum or not originating from it could have access there.

Another characteristic feature is that in the last two decades of the socialist era there was a tendency for people of nomenclature origin to look not so much to inheriting the political positions of their parents but to seek prestigious but less responsible positions,

¹⁶ „The „top“ of society seems to be entirely missing as a real social community among the variety of communities in our society. It is „missing“ not only for the inquisitive researcher but in official statistics as well“ [Georgiev 1989: 177; my emphasis – T. Z.]

such as those in diplomacy, the secret police, foreign trade, or creative intellectual professions. There was a clear orientation to closer contact with Western civilization and its benefits. The „classical“ party careers seemed to be handed over to an extent to young indoctrinated careerists with a „correct“ nomenclature social position.

Generalizing on the social mobility of this period, Zygmunt Bauman has given perhaps the most precise definition, stating that in communist countries individual mobility was effectively „nationalized“, meaning that the state had full monopoly over allocation of social positions and individual growth [Bauman 1989]. For this system it was characteristic to use a full range of centrally managed means by which the state could to a great degree influence the processes of social mobility; administrative rules and restrictions played a central role here [see Ferge 1979].

Another aspect of the processes of social mobility in that context was related to the typically socialist factors of change in the social-group structure of society, such as the forced collectivization of agriculture and accelerated Stalinist industrialization. It is well known that these two processes brought about a drastic transformation in the social structure. During the so-called transition period the independent peasants disappeared as a social group and in their place collective agrarian workers appeared (following the model of Soviet kolkhozes).

The worker class grew quickly and to a scale unnecessary for the needs of Bulgaria, the newcomers to the group being a kind of quasi-proletariat. These processes continued till about the middle of the 1960s, after which the group of the so-called „officials“ started to grow. Naturally all this involved enormous migration (we must not forget that political changes in Bulgaria led to a large wave of emigration in the 1940s) and a change of the social position of masses of people, which involves high values of the social mobility dimension.

On this basis the communist ideologists launched the thesis about the „incomparably higher degree of mobility and openness of socialist society compared with the capitalist one“. But what lies behind the figures? As the Hungarian researcher Istvan Harcsa correctly points out: „...low or high mobility in itself does not give a clear idea about the processes of social change: the actual

dynamics of the latter can be interpreted only by knowing the other social characteristics“ [Harcza 1989: 65].

It has turned out that the negative consequences of such a mobility have far outweighed the positive ones. The most considerable negative result was the depopulation and the severely aggravated demographic structure of the Bulgarian village. There was an intense rustification of the large cities and of the working class, and the qualification level of all the other social groups and of their labour activeness was decreased, which became an obstacle to the growth of labour productivity and of the living level of the population“ [Dimitrov 1988: 10].

The migrants themselves had great difficulties adapting to the new conditions and environment, which created intense social tensions and conflicts. These migrations caused great urbanistic problems (in terms of housing, transportation, social infrastructure, etc.) in the large cities, problems that will not be resolved for many years to come. The quickly expanded group of the so-called „officials“ is perhaps the outstanding parasitic formation in the social structure engendered by our socialist development. The totalitarian dictatorship, like any other regime [Marx 1974: 246], could not simply hover in mid air, in a social void. It needed a social basis of its own, and to serve this need it created a party apparatus, an inflated state administration, a large repressive apparatus (all of which came under the label of „officials“).

These are some figures cited by N. Tilkidjiev on the topic: „Even according to the official state statistics services, in the period 1970-1985 the number of managing staff grew 2–3 time, while during that same period the relative share of low-rank (direct) managers decreased 2–3 times“ [Tilkidjiev 1998: 122]. Further on he writes: „in only a single year (1986–87) the absolute number of managing staff increased by 11,700, the main increase being in the category of the so-called leaders of socialist organizations and other such [Tilkidjiev 1998: 123]. In addition, the need for encompassing and controlling all social structures and social cells caused a proliferation of the middle and high rank bureaucracy (a basic element of the „officials“ category) in all spheres of society. Ultimately it turned out that the quick overall growth of this category concealed the doubling and tripling of

leading staff at the expense of low-rank leaders in the period 1970–1985 [Raychev et al. 2000: 79].

„The bureaucratic structure embodied in the party-state bureaucracy in the societies of real socialism had a life of its own, its own laws of development, and found within itself the capacity for growth and reproduction“ [Georgiev 1989: 104, my emphasis – T. Z.]. Moreover, the subsequent important characteristic of this category was that, having reached a certain level of expansion, it became more closed within its own reproduction (but it would be very difficult to adduce data as proof of this statement) and became more isolated from society.

On the other hand, the assumption concerning „large and free mobility“ proved greatly exaggerated.

First, international comparative analyses indisputably showed that in post-industrial societies a similar level of mobility had been attained, but over longer periods of time, hence at less temporally dense and intensive rates.

Second, this mobility had an exclusively structural character (i. e. it was due to the change in the production-economic structure of professions), and it is a generally shared opinion among researchers that circulatory mobility serves as an indicator for openness of the structures [Janicka 1973: 82].

The third argument, which continues and confirms the previous one, is the fact that around the middle or even at the start of the 1970s (it is impossible to set a precise starting or final point in time for these processes) there was an evident tendency for increase of the self-reproduction of the social groups (leaders, intelligentsia, and workers, but excluding peasants, who simply did not reproduce as a group), i. e. in direct proportion to the abatement of structural changes, the closure of the main elements of the social structure increased.

Fourth, the large social mobility can be estimated positively only when the upward direction prevails over the downward. But is this true for the processes in question? With the exception of movement towards the groups exercising totalitarian domination and towards the intelligentsia (which are a considerably smaller part), all other movements can hardly be characterized as upward.

The four basic streams – destruction of the middle strata, the transformation of the private farmers into cooperative low-skilled

workers, and these in turn into workers – combined downward and neutral mobility, i.e. these movements did not lead to higher social status.

The last blank page in this history is related to the prevailing actual principles and mechanisms of social mobility during this period, meaning, of course, ways for attaining higher social positions and generally positions achieved by social climbing (the urge for mobility is never aimed to lower social positions). The main difference (which is the most generalized characteristic) between the principles of social climbing in developed countries and in the socialist ones was the non-meritocratic basis in the latter. The objective requirements for specific qualities and characteristics of people engaged in each kind of activity were not essential for optimal performance. Normally such qualities ought to be adequate education and qualification, aptitude and experience, and certain personal qualities. Instead, the decisive criteria were ones like social origin, political affiliation and indoctrination, kinship ties with people in power, obedience and servility, etc. The mechanisms for realizing these were in part typically feudal (i.e. nepotism and nomination instead of election), and in part „socialist“ (education received at workers faculties, the appointment of leaders-practitioners, and the entire system of privileges for gaining access to certain degrees and kinds of education – for instance until the mid 1970s enrollment in higher schools was based on categories listed under the letters of the alphabet, where the letter „g“ stood for the category of children of active militants in the illegal period of Communist Party activity, etc.) For all positions from a certain level upward (and in fact this level comprised the basically non-prestigious positions) the supreme filtering was exercised by the party organ and/or the institutional representative of the police apparatus. The need for creating the likeness of a normal society induced the political leadership of that time to clear the education system of formal legal inequalities, but since education is the basic „elevator“ for social advancement in contemporary societies, inequalities were retained or new informal channels were opened for obtaining prestigious education. Without going into concrete details, we may indicate the fact that many of the party functionaries in the last years of the regime quickly acquired doctoral degrees in the

sciences.

5. Methodological Bases of this Study

The causes of this lag have been sought at different levels. The insufficiency of the main explanatory perspectives that have been used for many years in public, is due foremost to the fact that they do not take into account, and for various reasons even ignore, a fact that is particularly important for sociology: the significant and sociologically specific properties of society that have been modeled by and inherited from communist totalitarianism. Foremost among these are the quality of the social structure, or, figuratively speaking, of the social pyramid. I am referring to the kind of pyramid and to the configuration and subordination of the social-group agents, the established societal ties and interaction between agents, which involve the functioning and reproduction of specific patterns of social inequality in society. These inequalities stem from the interrelated processes of construction and crystallization of a specific kind of social structure and certain institutionalized patterns of real social mobility, which operate as a transmission for realizing certain changes in the structure and determine the kind of structure it is. The basic idea behind this work is to trace the interaction between social mobility and the changes in the social structure in a dynamic perspective; the mobility and changes all produce a certain permanent set of inequalities in society. These social inequalities predetermine and form the mass of other inequalities at a lower level and are qualitative characteristics of society, hence they can serve as general characteristics (indicators) of that society.

The main task to be achieved here is to use the new analytic instruments of sociology of social stratification and mobility so as to measure, in terms of mobility, the qualities of the social-group structure that would remain concealed if we used classical methods alone. We need to know how certain qualities of the social structure have changed during the socialist period and in the subsequent transformation of the system. In this way, I believe, additional knowledge can be obtained about certain regularities in the manifestation and impact of certain social-group inequalities during the times of real socialism in Bulgaria; by comparing these

qualities, typical for the transformation period, we may seek more extensive generalizations regarding the formation and functioning of the social group cross sections of society typical for the socialist period and for the first seven years of transformation of the system.

Referring to what has been said so far, we see there are several basic scientific reasons for proceeding with this work. Foremost is the need to clear away the ideological filler in past studies and analyses of social mobility produced by Bulgarian sociology. After that it is necessary to extract to the possible maximum the available empirical information basis in order to describe the inequality aspects of the social structure of totalitarian society in Bulgaria. This would deepen our knowledge of the society of those times but would also help us understand, and, to a certain degree, „master“, the inefficiency of our transition, inasmuch as the processes going on at present are predetermined by past states. A third reason is the need to apply to mobility analyses in our country the international methodological standards and use foreign methodological experience more extensively in this field. Directly connected with this is the fact that the quantitative determination and measurement of these inequality parameters will serve as a methodological standardized basis for comparative analyses with respect to results from similar foreign studies. These comparisons in turn will enable comparisons with studies of these phenomena in future stages of development of Bulgarian society, which will be based upon new economic and political foundations.

Thus the basic research concept of the project takes shape: through analysis of the gathered empirical material that pinpoints the processes of social mobility in four moments in time across a twenty-year period of recent Bulgarian history, to describe in a dynamic aspect the parameters of the social structure of society with reference to the inequality characteristics of totalitarian society on one hand and of society in course of transformation on the other. The fundamental questions to be answered in this work are the following: what are the corresponding qualities of this structure in the two social contexts; does each of these contexts have its characteristic system of qualities of the social structure and, if so, what are the differences between the two; what is the

direction of changes of these qualities for each of the contexts.

The main goal of the study is, by analyzing the processes of social mobility and the dimensions of the social-group structure in Bulgaria over a long period of time in contemporary history, and in using specialized methods, to determine and measure such inequality aspects of social-group structure as: its type; the openness or closure of the structure and of its components; the freedom and intensity of inner-group exchange as a whole and the proximity of distances between elements of the structure on the basis of concrete flow from one group into another.

The concrete theoretical approach applied here to understanding and studying the interaction between social-group structure and social mobility serves as a methodological basis for further analysis in this work; it can briefly be described by the following assumptions:

1) The changes of the social structure of society on one hand and the social mobility on the other are viewed by me as two interconnected and mutually determining aspects of the subjective dimension of the process of social changes. It would not be scientifically adequate to observe and study this process in limiting ourselves to a study of only one of these two sides.

2) Social mobility is an expression of, and also a factor for bringing about, a certain system of social structuring and a certain type of relations of social inequality. It is a sound indicator of a certain kind of social structuring, for, on one hand, social classes exist when a social position is handed down from generation to generation; hence, a certain degree of group closure is an obligatory condition. On the other hand, the movement between groups indicates the strength of obstacles and distances between groups and, also, the process of destabilization (breakdown, destruction) of a structure.

3) The structure is not external to, not merely a framework for, mobility; the state of the structure is connected with the concrete form in which mobility manifests itself [Harcha 1987].

4) The patterns and intensity of social mobility can serve as indicators of the basic social relationships of a given structure [Wesolowski 1992].

5) The 'social class' is an integral whole of class positions between which mobility occurs easily and typically [Weber 1975].

6) The greater the closure of mobility chances, the more this promotes the formation of easily distinguishable classes [Giddens 1973].

7) The elements of the social structure can be mutually distinguished on the basis of the concrete kind of closure applied by groups in their social practice [Parkin 1974].

8) The identification of distinct mobility patterns that stabilize the existing structure on one hand, and those that lead to its destabilization on the other [Goldthorpe 1980].

In this analysis I will restrict myself to inter-generational social mobility. This limitation is due to the following three considerations.

The *first* is related to the fact that, amongst the existing empirical information from various national studies, the information regarding inter-generation mobility is more comprehensive, more methodologically well-founded, and, especially important for our purposes, it is comparable.

The *second* consideration is related to the ontology of the phenomenon: inheriting and changing of social status with all the accompanying mechanisms for this, are better indicators of the „leading“ mechanisms of social inequality in society. Moreover, in the literature on this topic the inter-generational mobility is viewed as an indicator of inequality of chances that persons have of achieving certain social positions according to their social origin.¹⁷

6. Research Methods Used, Limitations, Data and Class Categories

The basic, most general method used in this study is the comparative historical method. In this case the same parameters of the condition and development of the social group structure of a society (Bulgarian society) will be compared at four moments of its development. This work combines primary and secondary analysis of empirical data from five representative nation-wide surveys of our social-class structure, covering the period 1977–

¹⁷ The view is that the maximum equality of chances, called ‘full openness of the social structure’ – signifies minimal dependency of the achieved social positions on inherited positions [Janicka 1973: 61].

1997.

As for the concrete methods of analysis, I should emphasize that the problem field of social mobility as a sociological discipline has, from its very beginnings, been one of the fastest developing fields with regard to methodology. That is why Wesolowski is right in generalizing that sociologists of social mobility undoubtedly stand out among their colleagues with respect to their methodological and statistical knowledge [Mach & Wesolowski 1982: 2]. The set of tools here comprises a rich set of methods, models, indices, etc., the development and use of which is often done without commitments to any specific theory; what occurs can be described as a „race for statistical armament“ [Mach & Wesolowski 1982: 23]. That is why the choice of certain methods for analysis of mobility processes must be based on certain clearly presented and explicit theoretic premises. Thus the premises dictate the use of models that take into account the interaction of social group structure on one hand and the processes of social mobility on the other. In addition they determine the need for models that not only describe and measure the process of mobility per se but can also say something about the nature of the social structure itself.

In this work the use of various statistical and mathematical techniques for analysis of empirical material goes from simpler to more complicated, starting with the comparison of percentage distributions in tables of statistical data or classical matrices of mobility; further on more complicated indices for comparison of structures (distributions) are used, such as Charvat's indices of differences between two distributions [1988], the model of equal chances for mobility.

Further on we use models that have been well tried in past research on mobility: those of N. Rogoff [Rogoff 1953]; S. Yasuda [1964], R. Boudon [Boudon 1973] and the rather complicated and wide in scope model of R. Charvat [Charvat 1972]. Our empirical analysis concludes with the use of a relatively new method proposed at the end of the 1980s by the Polish sociologists Savinski and Domanski, which is very appropriate in this case for tracing certain qualitative characteristics of inequality that are rooted in the nature of the social structure in question.

It is time to indicate some problems and limitations of this kind of comparative analyses. The first methodological problem confronting all research on mobility, and specifically inter-generational mobility, is that, although the distribution of respondents by social groups may reflect an actual social-group structure at a given moment, the same structure may not be valid for their fathers. The structure of the father's generation is more or less approximate. For one thing, one and the same person may be present in two places: as a respondent and as the father of another respondent. Secondly, there is a considerable chance that the father with one or more working children will be present more than once in the fathers' category. The third consideration is of greatest importance here: in order to take into account inter-generation movements what is most often used is the social position of the father at the time when the respondent begins his/her work career, and that moment (supposing that the survey is representative for the entire structure) is dispersed within a period of about half a century, so that the reference to the social-group of the fathers of the present-day respondents actually concerns their social-group characteristics.

The second very important methodological question in studying mobility is connected with the fact that the results of analyses of social mobility are strongly dependent on the divisions we make in the social-group structure, in other words, on the type of classification of social groups. It would not be exaggerated to say that the level of mobility we get depends to a great degree on the classification used: if in the applied schema the boundaries between groups do not coincide with the actual ones, we will register a higher or lower level of mobility according to the size and number of groups. This is especially true when using more concrete and fragmented classifiers of groups. In very small ones and respectively in very large numbers of categories, we obtain an extremely high value for mobility, but it is an unnatural one, for the greater part of inter-group movements will be manifest as inter-group circulations. So in studies of social mobility (this is true for social-psychological crystallizations and the specifics of groups) we stand in need, to a much greater degree than in the study of the classical dimensions of stratification (income, power, education, prestige), of schemas of real social groups, not of quasi

groups. This basic issue remains open and is a permanent research task for sociologists.

The third very important and constantly recurring difficulty in social mobility research is connected with the possibility of making comparisons between data from different studies by means of the typologies of social structure used in them. This problem arises in nearly all diachronic comparisons that use secondary analysis. The results of one and the same (in terms of methodology and theme) study of social structure, periodically repeated, would be ideal for our purposes, but so far in our empirical sociology such conditions have not been available, and we must content ourselves with what we have. The greatest possibility for comparison is provided by the data from the last two studies, those of 1990 and 1997. In them the social-group structure is quite detailed at the micro level of social-professional groups, because well tried international classifications of professions have been used. In this way the aggregations to macro level obtained through them are most precise and carry the least risk of invalidity [Slomczynski 1978; Zlatkov 1998]; this is why groups that have been encoded at low levels can be re-aggregated to maximally close macro social groups in order to make them as identical as possible.

Thus we have obtained the following five macro social groups: 1) the intelligentsia (or specialists: the two terms will be used as identical); 2) employees; 3) workers; 4) peasants; 5) private producers or proprietors. The group of specialists comprises people of highly qualified mental labour that requires, as a rule, a higher education (in the Bulgarian case it comprises the categories of creative mental labour and management functions at higher level: categories 1 and 2 of the national classification of professions adopted by our central statistics since 1996 – essentially, this is a translation of the international classification of occupations ISCO-1988).

Then come employees: these are representatives of medium qualified routine, auxiliary labour that requires a secondary specialized or secondary general education: categories 3, 4, and 5 of the said classification. Then we have workers: representative of qualified and non-qualified physical labour in industry and transport: categories 7, 8, and 9 of the classification. The category

„peasant“ does not refer to the category of people residing in a certain type of settlement but comprises the representative of physical labour in agriculture (including hunting and fishing) – this is category 6 of the classification; in concrete tables it will be indicated whether the peasants are private farmers or work in co-operatives.

The last group, that of „private producers“, is present due to its existence as a category connected with social origin (usually this is the category of private producers among peasants), whence it is necessary to have matrices of mobility (with an equal number of categories for respondents and for the latter’s fathers). On the other hand, since 1990 this group has grown and become a more significant social category; its absence in previous periods would make comparisons impossible.

I wanted to move downward from a higher degree of concreteness – that of meso groups, but this was not possible, mostly due to the kinds of categorization used in the first two studies – certain analyses at the level of such groups (nine in number) were made for 1990 [Zlatkov 1994].

A very interesting point should be noted: all the moments of observation have an intense historical content. The first temporal moment was 1977. The period prior to this year was characterized by a severe diminishment of structural changes in society. According to the calculations based on Charvat, in the 1970s the structural changes in Bulgaria decreased two times compared with the 1960s (cited from Petkov 1986). The ‘snapshot’ from 1986 is especially important.

The middle of the 1980s was the high point of real socialism. This snapshot has accumulated in itself and reflects all the most characteristic political, economic, and social-cultural influences of communist totalitarianism upon the social structure of Bulgarian socialist society. This moment is considered to be the beginning of the ruin of real socialism. The period 1977–1986 was a period of economic stagnation and regress. Unlike Poland and Hungary, for instance, in our country in this period no attempts for real reforms were made, but rather various kinds of imitations of reforms.

Again unlike those countries, in this period there were no beginnings of civic initiative, of civil society; on the contrary, our society was marked by political apathy and somnolence. Because

of all these features, Bulgarian society of that period can serve as a „model“ of an anti-civil society with an anti-market economy, and hence changes towards the antipode of that society can be measured against it. The third point in time – 1990 – is also very important historically; it can be said to define a new stage. The field work in May of that year closely preceded the first post-communist free elections¹⁸.

The period it refers to (1986–1990) accumulated within itself the perestroika processes, the events in November 1989, including the historical plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party at which Todor Zhivkov was deposed (here we are not dealing with the issue as to whether this was an internal Party coup, a „revolutionary act“ or something else), the negotiations and agreements of the round table, and the preparation for election campaigning for the first post-communist free elections, those for Great National Assembly.

The last point in time is also historically definitive. The data here are from July 1997, shortly after the parliamentary elections of that year. The time at which the initial information was gathered was preceded by stormy political events and processes of ‘awakening’, by the crystallization of civil society. Overall the time was marked by an outburst of social energy and great positive expectations for the near future (here I do not deal with the opinions and attitudes but only with the objective characteristics of society, operationalized down to certain objective social-group characteristics of the respondents).

The last sub-period, 1990-1997, was a time of radical transformation of our society from one form to another, of change of the political superstructure and intense political struggle and opposition, of change of legislative order, as ever lagging, of processes of slow and shady privatization, the formation of new state institutions and structures of civil society, etc.; generally speaking, it was a transformation of the system. This road proved very winding for Bulgaria, with slumps and delays that generally made the country a lagger among most former socialist countries of Europe and placed Bulgaria in the same group as the countries

¹⁸ As to how free and democratic they were, cf Zlatkov 1992. In brief, according to the author they were neither; they were highly manipulated as a direct continuation of the „perestroika“ policy of the Bulgarian Communist elite.

of the former Soviet Union, rather than among the central European countries Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary. In any case, from a historical perspective each of these points in time proved stage-defining and crucial.

Chapter III.

DYNAMISM OF CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY DURING THE PERIOD 1977–1997

1. Changes in Social Structure over the Period

A logical first step would be to view the changes in social structure over the entire period. The simple reason for this limitation is that it was a structure classification used in 1967. Without this choice it would have been impossible to make a comparative analysis of the social groups.

In examining this tendency a rather different approach will be applied compared to the one that prevailed until recently, different in terms of periodization, assessment, labeling. Here it would be difficult to stick to official statistics, for the criteria used in statistics to define the social groups were not sociological and there is some degree of discrepancy in the content, hence in the size of the respective groups, according to sociological surveys and official statistics. We will base our study on structure data from the five surveys. Presented in table 1 are the relative shares of each macrogroup over the four periods in question.

Table 1.
Changes in social structure

Social Groups	1967*	1977	1986	1990	1997
Professionals	–	10,7	7,9	15,6	14,8
Clerical	16,7	14,9	17,8	25,5	28,1
Workers	50,9	51,4	50,4	45,0	40,8
Peasants	29,0	21,8	23,2	13,2	9,6
Proprietors	0,4	1,2	0,6	0,7	6,8
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

*In this survey category „professionals „ was in „white-collar“.

However we choose to qualify the changes that took place after Sept. 9, 1944 and up to the late 1960s, several parallel tendencies are evident in this period, some of which are contrary in value. Above all in this period there is a prevalent tendency to rapid increase in the number of workers: this number doubled every ten years during the period. Moreover by the end of the 1960s the groups of private rural producers and those of other categories of private business ceased to exist. The causes are perfectly clear: the total nationalization, collectivization, accelerated Stalinist-style industrialization, developments that, in Bulgaria, assumed a much more radical form (rapid, extensive and excessive) than in the Central European countries of the former Socialist bloc: this difference proved to be one of the significant obstacles, in terms of the nature of social groups, to the transformation of the system in our country. The middle section of the social pyramid had been removed, and the category of the typical middle strata were completely lacking. By contrast with Bulgaria, the private sector in Poland and Hungary was preserved not only in agriculture, but had retained a certain place in the spheres of services and small-scale industry.

The early 1970s represent a crucial point in the growth of the working class. As Krustyo Petkov has pointed out very precisely, that was the point when extensive development of industrialization had used up its ability to draw in human resource [Petkov 1986]. In brief, the overstraining of the process resulted in more damages than benefits to society and nature.

The considerable growth in numbers of the working class from the late 1940s to the early 1970s is generally considered to be a result of extensive economic development. We must say that the prevalent share of workers in the social-group structure represented the materialization of a specific ideological claim, it was a political act meant to serve as a basis for and indicator of the fact that Bulgaria is an industrial country. But this was far from true. The highly developed countries attained their levels thanks to a conspicuously intensive kind of development, which, beginning from the 1950s, led to the decrease in the share of workers within the overall structure.

In considering the data of table 1 we can point to examples of the reliability of sociological surveys: for the years in which survey data can be compared with those of statistical sources, the data from the two sources in regard to the basic social groups are almost identical. For instance according to statistics, workers amounted to 50% in 1972, while in the 1977 sociological survey the figure was 51,4%. Thus also the share of people employed in non-manual labour was 24,1% in the 1972 statistics, while in the 1977 survey employees plus intelligentsia amounted to 26,6%.

The considerable increase in the non-manual labour group that marks this period is a consequence of several processes. In the first place Bulgaria actually had to make up for a considerable lag behind the other European countries and this proved to be a strong factor for upward social mobility (through acquiring higher degrees of education and a corresponding change in the education-skills structure of the employed; on the other hand this leads to immoderate, inefficient growth in office, bureaucratic, administrative labour in all spheres of activity, a growth which begins to weigh more and more on the country's development, on the functioning of all subsystems of society: no wonder that the group interests of the inflated administration is said to clash with the need for rapid reforms.)

It is obvious that, over the period, the groups of professionals and employees have grown, professionals reaching a peak in 1990. The group of employees has continued to grow after this year. This is a result of the growth of the services sector, which, objectively estimated, is not sufficiently developed in this country.

A normal trend throughout this period is the decreasing

proportion of peasants in the structure after 1967, a trend that grew stronger between 1986 and 1990. We should have in mind a particular feature of Bulgarian society, which has a direct impact on these data: the Bulgarian village since the late 1970s began abruptly to age and a large portion of peasants are now pensioners.

As for the group of private producers, it is evident that before 1990 they were virtually absent from the structure. Their growth by 1997 is a concrete result of the development of the private sector, although there has been an evident retardation in privatization. In fact they are even more numerous than the data show, because a considerable part of the small private producers in the villages do not legally (due to the tardy reappropriation of the land) or psychologically perceive themselves as farmers, although their presence on the market is quite real.

I would like to see the similarity in structures reflected in the sociological surveys. They have been compared using the Charvat index (Table 2, p. 62). Here is its formula [Charvat 1988]:

$$E = 100 - \sum \min(a, b)$$

Where:

a – the concrete value in the first distribution,

b – the value in the other distribution.

This index of the difference between two structures (distributions) represents in essence a quantitative comparison between two distributions and shows relative share of the minimal needed changes in one of the distributions that can „transform“ it into the other [Charvat 1988: 115]. The clarity and simplicity of calculation are the basic advantages of its use. The index values range from 0 (identity of distributions) to 100 point (completely different distributions).

Figure 1.
Changes in differences between neighbour structures in the period 1967–1997




Table 2.
Indexes of Similarity of Social Structures

Year s	1977	1986	1990	1997
1967	9,0	6,2	21,7	29,6
1977	–	4,5	15,5	22,9
1986	–	–	15,4	23,3
1990	–	–	–	8,7

Table 2 shows that the greatest dissimilarity is naturally that between the structures of 1967 and 1997, followed by the dissimilarity between those of 1977 and 1986 as compared with the 1997 structure. The greatest similarity is between the structures in 1977 and 1986, followed by the nearly twice smaller

similarity between 1990 and 1997.

These data can only be interpreted on the basis of the normal logic of structural change, in which no abrupt change has been provoked: such logic implies that the greatest differences should be those between the most distant points in time, while the proximate moments should show much smaller differences (especially when the temporal moments are more than three, as in this case). It is logical that the 1997 structure should be the most different from all others, considering the changes in property and the correlations between sectors. It is noteworthy that the 1990 structure is rather different from the preceding ones; obviously the „perestrojka“ process and the events following the autumn of 1989 have had an effect on the type of structure even as concerns macrosocial groups.


There is a greater similarity between social structures nonproximate in time – those of 1967 and 1986 (6,2), than between the proximate ones of 1967 and 1977 (9,0). Moreover the greatest proximity is between the structures of 1977 and 1986 (4,5). These comparisons signify that the change in structure tends toward the initial state, i.e. the structure in the year 1967. This is one of the indicators of the very marked crisis of socialism in the mid 1980s, with its signs of economic crisis, social stagnation and regression.

2. Dynamism of Main Parameters of Social Mobility

The processes of social mobility in Bulgaria in the socialist period are in line with the general trends in the former ex-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They are mainly determined by four well known groups of factors: 1) collectivization, nationalization and augmentation in agriculture; 2) nationalization of industrial, big and small property; 3) intensive Soviet-type (route, with strong accent on heavy industry) industrialization and 4) growth of bureaucracy in all spheres of public activity and establishment of a specific administrative-executive apparatus specialized in political-ideological and economic domination of society.

After 1989 changes in social structure and restratification are results of systemic change, which process goes in Bulgaria slower

Figure 2.
Dynamism of main parameters of social mobility



than in former socialist countries from Central Europe. Nevertheless, we shall see that the processes of social mobility have become considerably more dynamic since 1990. But each thing in its turn.

Total mobility culminated at the start of the period and dropped to a record low by the mid-80s, and then rose significant between 1986 and 1990, it goes on up to recent, but weaker. We see that the level of mobility today cannot attain what it was in 1967. Structural mobility after its culmination at 1967 decline on equal level for next three moments. Lowest rate here is for 1990.

The main indicators of social mobility show that total, structural and circulation mobility peaked in the first period. This is also true of mobility gauged by the indicator of the hypothetical level of total mobility calculated by the equal-opportunity method [Rogoff 1953]. By that indicator, more than three quarters of all respondents have not inherited their parent's social status.

This percentage almost equals the hypothetical level of total mobility (95% of the latter), which is the highest indicator in all four periods under consideration. This is largely due to the highest level of structural mobility in those years, 50,4, or more than 65% of total mobility. In 1977 and 1986 it was almost half, 28, rising in 1990 to 61,4. This resulted from the completion of the processes of nationalization and collectivization and Stalinist-type intensive


industrialization precisely by the mid-60s. In terms of social-group structure, the main implication of those results was the annihilation of the largest group in traditional Bulgarian society, private peasants, followed by private dealers and artisans. In 1968, those groups comprised 1,7% in all of the whole social structure [Dimitrov 1974: 35].

All figures indicate two main trends. Mobility plunged in the 1967–1986. This trend was more pronounced in the first half of the period. Circulation mobility also dropped to a record low in 1986. Notably, the figures for 1977 and 1990 were almost equal. Besides, there was a certain period during socialism when there were greater opportunities for individual achievement independent of the structural transformations. The reverse trend in 1990 is due not only to November 10, 1989 (the retirement of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s General Secretary Todor Zhivkov), but also to the various pre-1989 forms of „*perestroika*“ that at least partly opened certain channels of mobility through the drive for reform of the system.

The indicators of circulation mobility are consistent with those trends. They are quite close, on a level that is slightly above one quarter of the population (except 1986). The insignificant changes in the indicator over this quite long period of time evidently suggest a definite trend in society during socialism. Notwithstanding the major structural changes that triggered substantial structural mobility, the free exchange between the categories in the structure, based on personal and individual qualities and achievements, did not intensify and, except 1977, was by rule lower than structural mobility. Typically, circulation (net) mobility remained relatively steady throughout the period. It, too, was lowest in 1986. It began to grow after that year and increased considerably in the period between 1990 and 1997, which clearly shows that certain typical socialist barriers to mobility must have fallen.

Table 3.
Dynamism of Main Parameters Of Social Mobility 1977–1997

Parameters	1977	1986	1990	1997
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*For 1990 and 1997 moving to category „private business“ of respondents is part of upward mobility.

It is interesting to see changes in directions of vertical mobility in the period. It would be interesting to trace the changes in magnitude in each direction of mobility (Figure 3, p. 67).

The data are in keeping with the above mentioned observations. After a relative equality between upward and downward mobility in 1967, the first begins to prevail, growing most significantly between 1977 and 1986.

This is mainly due to the fact that a large portion of the workers and a part of the non-manual workers are of rural origin and when this source begins to run out, i.e. in 1997, the upward trend decreases.

3. Basic Differences Between Socio-Professional Groups by Social Origin

The social origin of persons by social groups shows which basic differences, stemming from the social structure, have affected the social position of various generations. It shows the degree of crystallization of the structure, the proximity or distance between groups in the social space; it shows which groups are more homogeneous and what socio-cultural transmissions have taken place between separate segments of the structure. In the present case, since the study covers persons with a professional

career of about 40 years, the differences by social origin reflect the influence of a whole set of processes. In such analyses some methodological difficulties and limitations should be taken into consideration. The fathers' „generation“ is not a generation in the precise sense of the term.

The social affiliation of the fathers does not correspond to an actual social-group structure, but is rather an averaging out of the characteristics of this structure at various points in time during this period. Moreover in their aggregate some persons have been represented there more than once in cases when two or more respondents have the same father (a redundancy that cannot be cleared away by any means).

For the sake of greater clarity and heightened relief of the differences between groups, I will use the affiliation of fathers to macro-social groups. Naturally the social origin of the representatives of all socio-professional categories is determined to a considerable degree by the presence of separate macro-social groups in the structure that has taken shape. In examining these analyses we must therefore take into consideration the relative presence of each of these groups in the overall structure. At the beginning of the period 41% of the fathers were peasants (including agricultural workers), a little more than 1/3 were work-

Figure 4.
Dynamism of social origin: non- manual – manual






Figure 5
Dynamism of social origin of all researched aggregates



ers; nearly 1/10 were employees, and only 1,5% were professionals. For entire socialist period (Figure 4, p. 68) about 80 % of whole population had origin from groups of manual workers. Since the end of 80-s this rate decline rapidly to two thirds of population. picture for entire socialist period.

Figure 6
Dynamism of social origin: professionals



The curve of rates of peasants origin (Figure 5, p. 69) is symmetric to the manuals one, whereas this for workers outside agriculture is characterized by invariable rates – about 37%. The origin from professionals steady increased for the whole period.

As for non-manual origin there are no surprises here either. Throughout all the period we observe a direct ratio between the position of the group in the scale of labour according to nature and contents, and the non-manual origin. For specialists this ratio is naturally the highest; it grew considerably in the 1977 – 1986 period and then became stabilized around 50%.

For employees there is stability of origin during the entire period, about 25% of them. We should further point out the considerable growth of these origins for workers between 1990 and 1997, due both to the large size these groups have attained, making them a large source for recruitment, and to the smaller attractiveness of specialist professions, in result of their lower status, a tendency evident since the mid 1980s.

On group level (see Figure 6, p. 69; Figure 7, p. Error: Reference source not found; Figure 8, p. 71; Figure 9, 72; Figure 10, p. 74) highest homogenous group in terms of social origin is peasants (Figure 9). For the socialist period influx to this group from other social backgrounds is slight.

Figure 7
Dynamism of social origin: clericals





Figure 7
Dynamism of social origin: workers



To the end of 80-s there is tendency of increasing of self recruitment. Since 1990 there is reverse tendency of rapid increase of influx from other social backgrounds, i.e. increase of it social openness.

On the group level beginning with the specialists, professions (Figure 6, p. 69). It is very significant that in 1977 only 6,3% were hereditary intelligentsia. Subsequently the percentage attains a point of stability in the other temporal moments, situated at about 30%.

The employees (Figure 7, p. Error: Reference source not found) group proves more stable in its reproduction: for 1977 and 1986 about 25%; then in 1990 and 1997 the level falls to 16%. This is one of the basic social groups that has a rather low reproduction level for the entire period.

The workers (Figure 8, p. 71) typically maintain an average level of about 50% throughout the whole period, except for the beginning.

For peasants (Figure 9, p. 72) the initially low average of 25% is due to the fact that they are cooperative peasants, and at the time they were mostly descendants of private farmers. After that


we observe that their reproduction increases considerably and by the mid 1980s and early 1990s it reaches 9 out of 10. A considerable fall of the average in 1997 is due mainly to the dismantlement of cooperative farms.

Typical for proprietors (Figure 10, p. 74) is the greatest absence of self-recruitment; this is self-evident and need not be discussed here. This was a minute and marginal category in Bulgaria before 1990.

The first notable thing is that, except for the group of specialists, the representatives of all other groups are mostly of worker or peasant origin. The other correlation is that with regard to the share of people of rural origin in the separate groups, there is a clear threshold between the non-manual labour groups on the one hand and the blue-collar manual workers on the other, where the share of rural origin is visibly higher.

Moreover, with regard to origin there is a noticeable reverse proportion in the group of high rank officials in positions of leadership between the nature and contents of their work and their share of rural origin (30%); instead of being at the bottom of the scale in this respect, they have a higher percentage than specialists and even than technicians, and are much more similar in this respect to employees.

Figure 8
Dynamism of social origin: peasants




They turn out to be a much more rural category than specialists and technicians.

The following correlation that emerges is the direct proportion between the position of the socio-professional group on the scale of nature and contents of work and the percentage of family origin from the group of officials. But here too the group of top-rank officials presents an anomaly even greater than its previous one: in their percentage of persons originating from the group of officials, they are in fourth place, even behind the group of employees (clerks).

Here too the main threshold is between the group of non-manual and the group of manual labour. With regard to working class origin things are more complicated. Four groups are prevalent here: technicians, clerks, top-rank officials, and commercial workers (in this category the share of working class origin slightly surpasses that of rural origin).

Among specialists, the percentage of workers' origin shares first place with intelligentsia origin, and in the other three groups (skilled workers, un-skilled workers, and farmers) the lower a group is on this scale, the smaller the worker origin percentage becomes at the expense of rural origin. Intelligentsia origin has a considerable presence only in two groups, specialists (29%) and officials in leadership positions (24%).

Figure 9
Dynamism of social origin: proprietors



These percentages may seem small, but it could hardly be otherwise, given that only 8% of the fathers are representatives of the intelligentsia group.

4. Intensity of Movements between Social Groups

In cases when there is a distinctly evident and easily demonstrable vertical arrangement of social groups¹⁹, and such precisely is our case, the classes so defined are distinctly separate and subordinated in a hierarchical order based on such fundamental objective criteria as the nature, contents and complexity of the work (here we could add the education level and income typical for each of these groups, and, in subjective terms, the social prestige which forms a scale similar to this ranking). We then have the possibility of seeking and applying dimensions that supplement the analysis of the dynamics of mobility, the changes in the structure of origin, and the size of the directions on the vertical scale of social mobility.

The search for these measures is a result of a series of questions concerning the size, intensity, and direction of mobility.

¹⁹ Here I am excluding the group of private entrepreneurs; throughout the paragraph, the discussion refers only to the other four groups.

For practice has shown that in an evolutionary development of society, the most typical flows are between neighbouring pairs of groups in the hierarchy, groups defined precisely on the basis of these objective criteria.

It is not irrelevant whether we have a high mobility between peasants and workers or between employees and specialists on the one hand, and peasants (or workers) and specialists on the other. Sometimes a jump of 5% of the population from the lowest to the highest level of the scale has far greater consequences for society than does a 50% flow between neighbouring groups. In order to establish the force of these transitions, we need new methods, for the large set of available methods gives us minimal information or none about these dimensions of mobility.

For this purpose two relatively simple indexes can be used, which characterize the distance covered by a person from the class of origin to his/her present social position. The vertical ordering of

Figure 10
Dynamism of social origin: proprietors





Figure 11.
Vertical social mobility (%)*



*For 1990 and 1997 moving to category „private business“ of respondents is part of upward mobility.

classes here I will assume to be an interval scale²⁰. In such case, to each class can be assigned a rating corresponding to its place in the scale, and we can obtain an index of the origin of the social group (see Figure 11, p. 75).

These are essentially calculations of averages, and each group is given a rating: specialists – 4, employees – 3, workers – 2 and peasants – 1. A given category gets a rating of 4, if all persons in it are of specialist origin; it gets a rating of 1, if they are of peasant origin. If all person in a given category have inherited their position (none have come into the group with a different origin and there is complete immobility in this respect), then it obtains a value equal to its assigned rating (for instance if all respondents who are workers are also of workers' family origin, then this group obtains a rating of 2).

This simple mathematical method is especially fitting for temporal comparisons of a structure with an equal number of elements, as in our case. It is also appropriate for international

²⁰ The assumption being made here is of a common enough kind in the sociology of social stratification, when applying various mathematical and statistical models and methods.

comparisons when there is a standardized classification of groups.

Of course this method is not universally applicable and is not without shortcomings. For instance for the groups situated at the extremes of the scale (in this case specialists and peasants) it well shows the divergence from full immobility, because the possible movements are from a single direction; as for the intermediate positions, any divergence from this status could be a result of the mutual averaging out of the ratings of groups situated in opposite positions on the scale.

That is why this is a method that supplements our previous analyses in our efforts to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the groups' background.

The foremost striking feature of the figure is that the differences between groups in terms of their real statuses are considerably smaller than those between the statuses in the categories of full inheriting of positions or full lack of openness of groups. The second feature is that the higher the position of a group, the greater the divergence from immobility (this is most obvious when comparing the average for the period X).

On the other hand, however, there is a clear tendency for all groups to a drawing closer of their real and model status. The fourth notable feature is the considerable proximity between the values of the real status of employees and workers, and a considerable presence of persons of worker origin in the group of

Figure 12.
Intensity of movement: professionals





Figure 13.
Intensity of movement: clerical




employees, which once again confirms the fact that there is very real proximity between these groups in the social space during the period we are discussing.

The next method is known as the index of mobility intensity of the social groups; it serves to measure the magnitude of the transition, i.e. how far the social origin of a person is situated from his/her present status on the scale, as well as the direction – higher or lower on the scale – from which the persons have come.

This index takes into consideration only the mobile persons in a given category; through it we can easily observe the fluctuations in the intensity and the trends; this can easily be continued through an extrapolation of these tendencies in a short-term temporal perspective²¹.

²¹ Since in this case we have 4 levels, we have 3 levels to be surmounted. To 1 level we ascribe the rating 0,33; to 2 levels, 0,66; and to 3 levels, the rating 1. The maximum of 1, possible only for groups situated at the extreme ends of the scale, is attainable when all persons come from the third level and from 0 – when there is lack of mobility. When the shifts are coming from the direction of the lower levels, they have a minus sign; when from higher levels, a plus sign. The value of the index for intensity of a given group is obtained from the total sum with a positive sign for all values of the relative shares of people originating from a given group, calculated through a corresponding rating for this group, without taking into account the direction, upward or downward. This can be done separately for individuals coming only from higher or only from lower levels; the difference between these two values I call the vector of intensity, as it registers above all the prevailing direction of intensity. Persons at the extreme ends of the scale have the greatest distances to overcome and can move only in one direction: three levels away from the bottom for the specialists and three from the top for peasants. Employees are one level away from the top and two from the bottom; vice versa for the workers; in other words, the intensity is directly correlated to the

Figure 14.
Intensity of movement: workers



The general picture of the intensity of mobile persons for the separate groups completely harmonizes with our analyses in previous paragraphs.


The direct dependency is obvious: intensity grows in parallel with the higher rank of the group in terms of the nature and contents of labour, the most significant threshold being between groups of non-manual labour and of manual labour.

Throughout the entire period „the structure has been built using material from the bottom upward“. It should be noted that the intensity of groups, excluding the peasants, during the transition period has decreased; in the intermediate groups (employees and workers), the intensity is directly correlated with the social order: in the socialist period intensity grew, and in the post-socialist period it has been decreasing. But importantly, these dimensions cannot be perceived through other methods.

The curves of the indicators for separate groups do not require special comments. In the specialist group (Figure 13, p. 77) the peak was at the start of the period; the trend after 1990 was toward decrease of intensity. The group of employees (Figure 14, p. 78) stands out among other categories with the smallest fluctuations in

position of a group on the scale; but this simplification directly reflects reality (for instance a concrete real person of employee origin usually has far greater chances for attaining the specialist category than a person of peasant origin. This should be had in mind when making inter-group comparisons, but it is not important when tracing the dynamics in time for each separate group. We should have in mind that here the relative shares are out of the total number of persons for a given group. The values would be different if we were to take the distributions as the basis, and the total number of mobile persons is assigned the value 1.

Figure 15.
Intensity of movement: peasants



levels and with the constant vector throughout the socialist period, the decrease in intensity being due to the decrease in the flow coming from below.

For the workers group (Figure 15, p. 79) the curve of intensity is almost the same as that of employees, the difference being that between 1986 and 1990 there was a boom of intensity coming from below, followed by a trend of constant decrease. The curve of the peasant group is very interesting (Figure 16, p. 80). This is the only group showing a rise of intensity since the start of the „perestroika“, i.e. a growing tendency for persons originating from groups situated above the peasants to enter the latter’s group.

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Chapter IV.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY PROCESSES

1. A Study of the Interaction between Structural Changes and Circulation Movements

Empirical analyses in this part of the study proceed from and support the basic theoretical principle of my approach, namely, that social-group structure and social mobility are two interconnected and mutually determined aspects of the same process, of the functioning and development of society in terms of its human subjects. The structure serves to a great degree as a framework determining the limits and forms of social mobility; on the other hand the changes in structure are realized through processes of social mobility: the latter is in the final account the basic social mechanism of transmission, which determines the kind of structure and its changes. That is why, after analyzing in the previous chapter the dynamics of changes regarding social-group structure, the trends in the development of mobility processes, and the change in the recruitment basis of social origin of the macro-social groups during the examined period, we now turn to a more detailed scrutiny of the connection between the changes of social structure and the processes of intergeneration mobility.

For this purpose we are here applying an analytical model proposed by Frantisek Charvat [Charvat 1972]. This model was presented and tested in Bulgarian sociology in two projects (for more details, see Molhov & Zlatkov 1986; 1991). Therefore I will spare the technological description of the model and will try to briefly clarify what the model measures and what characteristics it describes.

The most interesting characteristic of the model is that it gives

certain synthetic information about the trends in the change of the social groups in society for a given period of time; more precisely, the changes in the structure that outline the framework of mobility, the intensity of entry and exit from certain categories, and the even or uneven course of these movements.

In the Charvat model, the social-class structure (as well as social stratification) is treated as a series of social sub-sets of individuals. Each member of society belongs to precisely one of these classes (sub-sets), and the total sum of classes amounts to the entire society. To give a quantitative expression of this stratification, the model proposes the so-called stratification index:

Using these indicators, one can determine the trends in change in the relation between the numbers of the groups, trends indicating whether for a given period there is a transition to a uniform or an uneven distribution of the population across the various categories of the structure. The stratification index (J/t) attains its maximum when there is complete uniformity, i.e. all elements of the structure are even in volume, while its minimum is attained when the numbers of all categories but one are equal to zero, in other words, when the structure formerly comprised several categories, but now consists in only one.

For assessment of structural changes, the model offers a measure of stratification mobility: this measure is a derivative of the stratification index at a given moment in time. Its values indicate: 1) if it is positive, that the stratification movement tends toward greater uniformity; 2) if it is equal to 0, the tendency is toward preserving the uniformity, and 3) if it is negative, the stratification movement tends to a decreasing uniformity (increasing unevenness). The measure of mobility ($m\Delta t$) has the property of tending to infinity when the number of categories changes.

Charvat then introduces the term „social diffusion“, a movement from one class to another, which might lead to an emptying of a given class or classes of the structure and to the appearance of new classes. Thereby diffusion can be considered a „cause“ of social mobility (the quotation marks are Charvat's). The so-called „index of emigration“ serves as a quantitative expression of this movement, given in the following formula:

$$I de = - \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{P_i}{P} - \lg \frac{P_i}{P}$$

Here P_i is the proportion of individuals who have left a given class i , and P is the number of all shifts from one class to another. Analogical is the immigration index: $I di$, where the numerator indicates the share of people who have entered the i – class, while the denominator is the same.

The indicator of emigration trends reaches a maximum when the emigration level is the same for every element of the stratification, i.e. when the proportion of social emigrants for every component is the same, and it reaches a minimum when the stratification components have the most highly uneven shares of emigration, i.e. when only the members of a single component of the stratification participate in social diffusion. Analogical is the behaviour of the immigration trend indicator. The relation between these two indexes is called the indicator of the type of movement – the type of concentration of the social diffusion, by

Table 4.
Values of Charvat’s Model Indexes: 1977

Categories Measures	Professionals	Clerical	Workers	Peasants	Proprietors
Proportional distributions fathers	0,01	0,10	0,38	0,41	0,10
Proportional distributions respondents	0,11	0,15	0,51	0,22	0,01
Proportional distributions emigrants	0,54	0,70	0,36	0,65	0,98
Proportional distributions immigrants	0,94	0,79	0,53	0,33	0,85

The stratification indexes: $J I = 0,54$; $J II = 0,54$.

Mobility measure: $m \Delta t = - 0,006$, $\Delta t = 22$.

Indicators of emigration, immigration, and types of movement (respectively): $I de = 0,62$; $I di = 0,54$; $I dk = 1,15$.

Table 5.
Values of Charvat's Model Indexes: 1986

Categories Measures	Professionals	Clerical	Workers	Peasants	Proprietors
Proportional distributions fathers	0,04	0,09	0,35	0,48	0,03
Proportional distributions respondents	0,08	0,18	0,50	0,23	0,006
Proportional distributions emigrants	0,43	0,57	0,32	0,59	0,96
Proportional distributions immigrants	0,70	0,78	0,52	0,15	0,77

The stratification indexes: $JI = 0,51$; $JII = 0,53$.

Mobility measure: $m \Delta t = -0,008$, $\Delta t = 22$.

Indicators of emigration, immigration, and types of movement (respectively): $I de = 0,62$; $I di = 0,56$; $I dk = 1,11$.

analogy with the physics of solutions:

$$(2) Idk = \frac{Ide}{Idi}$$

When the indicator of type of movement (Idk) is greater than 1, this signifies that in a society with a more uniform exit from the groups, there is a less uniform entry into those groups: more individuals enter some of the stratification components than the rest; hence the direction of movement is of a concentrated type. In the contrary case, when Idk is lower than 1, entry into a stratification component is more uniform than exit from that component, i.e. the concentration decreases and the movement is of a non-concentrated type. When $Idk = 1$ movement is neutral with regard to the size of the categories and retains the existing number of categories; the proportion of individuals moving out of each category is equal to those entering those same categories.

In the context of the currently operating theory of social mobility it is necessary to introduce the following specifications about the described model in order to link Charvat's terminology

to the generally used terminology in the sociology of social mobility, which we have strictly abided by in our work.

First, the measure of mobility actually measures the intensity of structure changes in time, i.e. the changes in the proportions between the components, which to a large degree determine structural social mobility, not the global social mobility in the generally accepted meaning of the term.

Second, social diffusion, as defined here, essentially refers or is equal to global social mobility, in which structural and exchange mobility is included. That is why there might be cases when a high level of social diffusion is present without any accompanying change of stratification in time (mobility is equal to 0). In these cases social diffusion is limited to circulating social mobility.

These details should be had in mind as we proceed to use Charvat's terminology.

The values of the indexes for 1977 (Table 4, p. 84) show that, as a result of the growing unevenness in the structure of the respondents' fathers and the negligible growth of the uniformity of the respondent's themselves, the two structures have become similar in their degree of unevenness (which does not imply that the two structures must have the same distribution of components). As a general trend, the movement remains oriented toward unevenness, but at a lower level than in the first period.

Typical for this period is that emigration from the categories of the parents has grown in uniformity, while immigration remains at nearly the same level; hence there is a higher value of the social diffusion index, which reveals a growth of the concentrated type of diffusion.

For the year 1986 (Table, p. 59) the trends we have outlined remain overall the same, but with some small differences: the structure of parents shows a very slight decrease in uniformity, while the measure of mobility, although continuing in the same direction, shows a slightly growing unevenness.

Social diffusion continues to be of the concentrated type, but is clearly weaker in force due to the slight increase of the uniformity of immigration.

The values for 1990 (Table 7, p. Error: Reference source not found) complete the trends outlined by previous years. The unevenness of the structure of respondents in relation to that of the parents has grown slightly. The movement toward unevenness of structures has decreased considerably, while the social diffusion has become more concentrated at the expense of the considerable

Table 6.
Values of Charvat's Model Indexes: 1990

Categories Measures	Professionals	Clerical	Workers	Peasants	Proprietors
Proportional distributions fathers	0,9	0,09	0,37	0,45	0,003
Proportional distributions respondents	0,16	0,25	0,45	0,13	0,007
Proportional distributions emigrants	0,45	0,55	0,49	0,76	1,00
Proportional distributions immigrants	0,72	0,84	0,58	0,17	1,00

The stratification indexes: $J_I = 0,54$; $J_{II} = 0,58$.

Mobility measure: $m \Delta t = -0,002$, $\Delta t = 22$.

Indicators of emigration, immigration, and types of movement (respectively): $I_{de} = 0,55$; $I_{di} = 0,44$; $I_{dk} = 1,24$.

decrease of the uniformity of entries into the respondents' categories.

For 1997 (Table, p. 59) we have a reversal of the trend observed hitherto. The unevenness of both structures – that of the fathers and of the respondents – decreases, and the decrease for the latter category is very slightly less than for the former.

The indexes of emigration and immigration present some growth compared with the previous year, i.e. the trend is toward growing uniformity in both streams. For the first time in the entire period the immigration index at this point in time exceeds the emigration index, which shows that the entry into the categories of the structure is more uniform than the departure from them, hence the type of social diffusion is non-concentrated.

The positive value of the mobility measure, which actually measures the correlation between the distribution of fathers and respondents, also indicates that the stratification movement is toward growing uniformity of the respondents' structure.

To summarize this discussion, the application of the model to this dynamic series of four points in time in the socialist period

Table 7.
Values of Charvat's Model Indexes: 1997


Categories Measures	Professionals	Clerical	Workers	Peasants	Proprietors
Proportional distributions fathers	0,12	0,14	0,39	0,26	0,09
Proportional distributions respondents	0,15	0,28	0,41	0,10	0,06
Proportional distributions emigrants	0,59	0,68	0,51	0,81	0,96
Proportional distributions immigrants	0,67	0,84	0,53	0,49	0,95

The stratification indexes: $J_I = 0,63$; $J_{II} = 0,61$.

Mobility measure: $m \Delta t = -0,003$, $\Delta t = 22$.

Indicators of emigration, immigration, and types of movement (respectively): $I_{de} = 0,62$; $I_{di} = 0,65$; $I_{dk} = 0,95$.

Figure 17.
Dynamism of stratification indexes*



* Here the horizontal numbers indicate the moments in time:
 1977–1997.

shows three main and interconnected trends of change of structure and mobility.

The *first* is that, while in the initial moment the uniformity of the structure of parents surpasses that of the respondents, in the course of time the two not only fail to become equal, but eventually come to a reversed correlation with higher values for the descendents.

Secondly, in this period the changes of structure are oriented toward decreasing unevenness (with a slight fluctuation in 1986).

Thirdly, we conclude that, in parallel with the previous two trends, if there has been a movement toward uniformity, then the entries must have been more concentrated toward some of the categories (with a slight fluctuation in 1986). In the transition period starting in 1990, the change of structure is different, consisting in a growing uniformity of both structures. The dynamics of the mobility measure, which in fact indicates the direction of change of structure, tends throughout the whole period to definitely growing uniformity of the structure, the movement being toward a decreasing non-uniformity up to 1990 and toward a growing uniformity in 1997.

The dynamics of the stratification indexes (see Figure 17, p. 89) indicate the following: among the fathers, or more precisely

the overall structure of origin for all groups, up till 1986 there is a decreasing uniformity of structure (of distribution); afterwards, symmetrically with the former, there is an increasing uniformity, i.e. in the beginning and final moments we have the greatest uniformity of social origin of the surveyed aggregates, while in the middle of the entire period, in 1986, the uniformity is lowest.

As a whole, the change of the structure of respondents during the period has moved toward increasing uniformity, i.e. the sizes of proportions of all categories in the social-group structure have drawn together.

The values of the indexes of emigration and immigration during the socialist period follow similar curves (see Figure 18, p. 90); the difference is only in the levels: those of emigration are higher, which shows that in this period the uniformity of exits surpasses the uniformity of entries into the categories of the structures, meaning that the type of movement is concentrated.

In the transition period (1990–1997) the situation changes radically: the values of both indexes grow considerably, but the uniformity of entries for the first time surpasses that of exits, and, due to this, the type of movement is now of a non-concentrated kind, i.e. entries into the group are more evenly distributed toward

Figure 18.
The dynamics of the indexes of emigration, immigration and types of movement




Table 8.
Openness of Social Groups and Whole Structure
1977–1997*

Groups	1977	1986	1990	1997	Σ
1. Professionals	0,61	0,47	0,53	0,69	0,57
2. Clerical	0,82	0,69	0,75	0,93	0,75
3. Workers	0,74	0,64	0,89	0,84	0,73
4. Peasants	0,57	0,28	0,30	0,64	0,57
5. Proprietors.	0,94	0,79	1,00	1,04	0,94
6. Whole structure	0,70	0,53	0,70	0,84	0,70

* At this point of observation in our statistics the group of professionals lay within the framework of the group of employees.

all categories of the structure than the exits. This, together with the information provided by the mobility measure, shows that the trend of change of the structure of the surveyed aggregate in 1997 is precisely a result of the processes of relative equalization (not identity in terms of absolute numbers) of the immigrant streams toward all groups, which convincingly shows that Charvat's model has successfully captured the changes of the structure as well as the changes in flows out of and into the categories of this structure.

2. Dynamism of Openness of Social Groups

We will measure the changes in the openness of social groups and the whole structure between 1967 and 1997 [Yasuda 1964; Janicka 1976]. The index is based on circulation mobility only, i.e. it eliminates the part of mobility due to structural changes. The index equals 1 when the exchange of persons of a certain origin with the other socio-occupational categories equals that in the perfect-mobility model. Table 9 (p. 96) shows the index by social group and for the whole structure.

The openness of the whole structure developed along similar lines as total mobility, but at a lower level. The least open (most self-reproductive) group was that of intellectuals, and the most open one (with hardly any status inheritance), that of proprietors.


The figures indicate that the whole structure was quite open in

three of the four periods under consideration. The very high level in 1967 dropped steadily, the 1986 index of approximately 0,5 suggesting a rather low level of openness. It subsequently intensified, reaching the 1977 level by 1990. To judge by the figures, there were greatest opportunities for free intergenerational exchange between macrosocial groups in the early 60s. This is indicative of relative freedom of personal achievement in Bulgarian society, these opportunities eventually diminishing with the establishment of so-called „developed socialism.“

On the social group level, the most open group was that of proprietors as a result of its annihilation in the first period of socialism and subsequent marginalization. Of the real groups in the period, the most open one was that of workers due to its pronounced growth as a result of intensive industrialization with a priority on heavy industry, which was ultimately inconsistent with Bulgaria’s size, economic tradition and natural resources.

The high openness of the group of salaried employees is also very typical of developments in the country in the period. On the one hand, this could be attributed to the normal growth of the services sector in the second half of the 20th century. Yet on the other, it ensued from the essential way in which socialism

Figure 19.
The dynamics of the indexes of emigration, immigration and types of movement



functioned and materialized: total and centralized administration and control over all spheres of public affairs was impossible without the establishment of a specific bureaucratic stratum. Ultimately both workers and salaried employees were the groups that were most indicative of and epitomized the social-group structure of socialism.

The group of intellectuals lagged tangibly behind the above two categories, with comparatively low openness. The group of peasants was the least open of all groups (and very low in absolute terms too). Interestingly, it started with very high openness in 1967, eventually decreasing to a very low level in 1990. At the start of the period this was due to nationalization in agriculture, and subsequently to its recession and collapse.

The figures show another interesting fact too: the white-collar groups (intellectuals and salaried employees) were the most open in 1977 – apparently the period when intergenerational barriers between the groups of manual and non-manual labour were lowest. The last typical trend we will note here is the steady upward mobility of workers, with a slight fluctuation in 1986. This is the group of origin from which it was relatively easiest to move to another group. At the same time, the group of workers was the easiest destination of the other groups.

3. Dynamism of Inequality of Chances for Mobility

In order to measure the dynamics of inequality of chances for mobility during this period we will use the index proposed some years ago (1986) by the Polish researchers Sawinski and Domanski, the so-called *inequality of chances index* for a given field of the mobility matrix. This index is a function of the Glass–Rogoff index, and its purpose is to characterize the deviations from the equal chances model (mentioned in Chapter Two, § 2). It is of the following kind:

$$(1) \quad q_{ij} = \frac{e_{ij}}{n} (g_{ij} - 1)^2$$

In order to understand the meaning of the index we must decypher the components of this formula. The expression e_{ij} is the absolute value of a given field in the matrix, obtained through the

equal chances model:

$$(2) \quad e_{ij} = (a_i b_j) / n ;$$

where a_i is the number of a category in a given row (in this case the category of fathers), while b_j is the value in a given column (in this case a given category of respondents). In this way the values of the equal chances model are calculated for each field (cell) of the mobility matrix. Each of these values shows what the numbers of a concrete field should be, assuming there is full statistical independence between the size of a given category of respondents and their fathers. Further:

$$(3) \quad g_{ij} = \frac{m_{ij}}{e_{ij}}$$

Here m_{ij} is the actual value of a given field in the table and the expression g_{ij} expresses the correlation between the real value in the table and the hypothetical value, assuming there is no statistical dependence between given extreme distributions in the table. Hence this term in the formula (1) shows to what extent the actual number of persons in a given field is smaller or greater than their hypothetical number (e_{ij}). The indicator g_{ij} is equal to 1 when the real and hypothetical values coincide.

The present index takes into consideration not only the relative size of deviation from the equal chances model (corresponding to the term $[g_{ij} - 1]^2$) but also the relative importance of a given field of the mobility table measured by the proportion of persons in a given field of the table with respect to the total number, a ratio calculated through the equal chances model.

The use of the inequality of chances index permits overcoming paradoxes of interpretation resulting from the use of the Glass–Rogoff index and from the fact that the latter is affected by the proportion of a given category out of the total number of persons [Sawinski & Domanski 1986: 46].

Some of the basic positive values of this index are pointed out [Sawinski & Domanski 1986: 47]. First, $g_{ij} = 0$ only when the Glass–Rogoff coefficient is equal to 1 (see formula 2), i.e. the real number of persons, m_{ij} , is equal to the number obtained through

the equal chances model. The value 0 is the minimal possible value of the index, consequently any positive value would indicate that the size of the influx in a given field does not correspond to the equal chances model, and the higher the value, the greater this disparity.

Another essential property of the index is based on the fact that positive and negative deviations from the equal chances model are treated identically. If, for instance, in some field of the table the added flow of persons is greater by 50 people than the number defined by the equal chances model, while in another field of the same importance the number is short of the model number by as many people, then the index values for the two fields would be equal.

An important advantage of the inequality of chances index is the possibility it affords for generalizing this measure across the entire mobility table. This is achieved by summing up the values of the index for all fields of the table [Sawinski & Domanski 1986: 47]:

$$(2) I = \sum_{i=1}^s \sum_{j=1}^s q_{ij}$$

This index is called the *general inequalities of chances* index and is designated by the letter *I*. It enables expressing quantitatively how far the observed mobility diverges from the equal chances model across the entire table. This is a very useful feature, as it allows using the index for synchronous comparisons between various structures (international comparisons) or diachronic comparisons of different structure within the same society, as in our case. Particularly important is that we have structures with an equal number of categories, as the size of this general index depends on the total number of cells in the table, which in turn depend on the number of categories in the rows and columns of the table. That is why we can freely and without limitations compare the levels of this index at the 4 moments being considered.

For one point in time, the year 1977, most important is that, overall, we observe a considerable decrease of the values of the unequal chances index, which implies an increase in equality of chances, given the possibility for more uniform attainment of various positions in the structure. In the above-mentioned inheriting of the positions of employees for this point in time there is a great decrease of deviation, i.e. we observe a sort of normalization of the processes. For this period the greatest divergence (of the level of real exchange from its model value) is observed among workers of rural origin – 0,046 points; in this case people whose origin is in the peasants group move toward the workers category more unequally and with a tendency toward greater representation in that group than would be the case if there were free (in conformity with the model) exchange with all categories of the structure. Next in order are the hereditary peasants, with a value of 0,034. Further on, with very close values are the specialists originating from the group of employees – c 0,028, peasants of worker origin (0,025) and employees originating from the specialists group (0,020). We should emphasize that for this point in time, among people originating in all groups of the structure and private entrepreneurs there is no inequality of chances for attaining this group (in this year they amount to only 1,2% of the entire structure and in all for the entire socialist period they do not exceed this percent, and as a category of origin they are the smallest group – 9,8%). Consequently this is true for the other points in time as well. Employees of workers origin also show no deviation from the model situation.

Table 9.
Values of General Inequalities of Chances Index 1977

Categories	Professionals	Clerical	Workers	Peasants	Proprietors
Professionals	0,022	0,020	0,003	0,002	0,000
Clerical	0,028	0,016	0,004	0,014	0,000
Workers	0,001	0,000	0,011	0,025	0,000
Peasants	0,005	0,006	0,046	0,034	0,000
Proprietors	0,002	0,001	0,001	0,007	0,000

Table 10.
Values of General Inequalities of Chances Index 1986

Categories	Professionals	Clerical	Workers	Peasants	Proprietors
Professionals	0,122	0,000	0,006	0,010	0,000
Clerical	0,023	0,032	0,006	0,016	0,000
Workers	0,002	0,001	0,023	0,044	0,001
Peasants	0,0	0,010	0,004	0,065	0,000
Proprietors	0,000	0,000	0,003	0,001	0,008

The values of the index for 1986 (Table 11, p. 98) show an increase of unevenness of flow between groups, i.e. an increase of inequality of chances for attaining various positions in the structure. This increase is most considerable for inheriting the position of specialists – 0,122. The values for the other cells are considerably lower than those indicated. It is worth noting the lower values for inheriting the position of peasants (0,065) and the exchange between workers and peasants (0,044). Moreover, in inheriting the position of employees, we observe a relatively high deviation of the actual level of exchange from the model one – 0,032. With regard to inheriting the social positions as a whole, this year is characterized by the highest levels of the index of inequality of chances for all categories of the structure with respect to all other moments in time for the entire period (we will return to this question later).

At 1990, similar to 1977, we once again observe a decrease of the index levels, which indicates a decrease of the uneven exchange and an increased equality in possibilities for exchange between categories. Here the specialists group again proves to have a higher inheritance indicator than it would have were there a hypothetical exchange based on equal chances – 0,075. This is yet another indicator of the reproducing closure of these groups (see § 3), a growing tendency that was evident throughout the socialist period. After them comes the peasants group, with an index value of 0,043. We should note a certain deviation of chances for exchange between workers and peasants (0,022) and workers and private entrepreneurs (0,018).

Next comes the inequality of chances for attaining the group of specialists on the part of peasants – we find that they had greater chances of this than workers (0,002) and even than employees (0,018). We should note the worker origin in the group of private entrepreneurs, where such origin is present to a higher degree (0,018) than implied by the model variant of exchange between these categories.

For the point in time that concludes the surveyed period – 1997 – the most notable characteristic is the continuing downward trend, obvious in the previous sub-period, of the index values: for most cells they are the lowest of all we have been comparing. The high index value of inequality of chances for the specialists to inherit positions – 0,055 – is seen to be a constant for the other years as well.

Very distinct is the excessively represented specialist origin in the current group of workers. Here we have an unnaturally (in contrast with the previous tendencies) strong movement in the inter-generation aspect from the group of specialists to the group of workers – 0,056 points, the highest value of the indicator for this year.

Table 11.
Values of General Inequalities of Chances Index 1990

Categories	Professionals	Clerical	Workers	Peasants	Proprietors
Professionals	0,075	0,000	0,015	0,006	0,000
Clerical	0,017	0,013	0,011	0,009	0,001
Workers	0,002	0,004	0,003	0,022	0,018
Peasants	0,018	0,012	0,000	0,043	0,001
Proprietors	0,000	0,000	0,003	0,002	0,000

Table 12.
Values of General Inequalities of Chances Index 1997*

Categories	Professionals	Clerical	Workers	Peasants	Proprietors
Professionals	0,055	0,000	0,056	0,008	0,007
Clerical	0,003	0,001	0,0006	0,006	0,00004
Workers	0,005	0,00001	0,006	0,006	0,00005
Peasants	0,006	0,0004	0,00004	0,023	0,0015
Proprietors	0,006	0,000	0,00001	0,012	0,001

*The values for this year are represented with more digits after the zero sign, because the values for certain cells are low and should not be rounded off if we are to distinguish zero values from values approaching zero.

This fact, together with the previous conclusions drawn in § 1, indicates that in this case the inequality of chances is moving toward a greater presence of specialists as the origin group of workers than would be normal according to the equal chances model; basically this is a quite distinct process of downward social mobility, which automatically leads to decrease of the general value of upward mobility observed so far (see the same paragraph).

It would be interesting to compare the dynamics of change of the inequality in terms of the chances of inheriting a social position for all groups (see Figure 20, p. 100).

For the sub-period up to 1986, there is a characteristic considerable rise of the values for all groups; the rise is greatest for the specialists group in the direction of over-representation of inheriting, and for the peasants group in second place. For the period 1986 –1997 the trend for all groups is toward decrease of the unequal chances index, but the leading place of the specialists group, followed by the peasants group, remains unchanged.

The dynamics of the unequal chances indicator for the entire structure for the entire period can be best expressed in a graph (Figure 21, p. 101).

In the period 1977–1986 we observe a considerable growth of the values: from 0,250 to 0,395 points; subsequently, for 1990 the value falls once again to the level of 1977 – 0,276. It reaches its

lowest level in the last year, 1997 – 0,205: of the whole period, this is the point where we observe the lowest degree of inequality of chances for exchange of people between all categories of the social structure. These values are absolutely consistent with the conclusions drawn in the previous paragraphs, so they can hardly be coincidental.

They outline certain dependencies in the development and functioning of society over the last period (or perhaps stage) of socialism and during the subsequent period of transformation. Considered all together, they indicate that the structure during the period we are examining, with its inherent mechanisms of change, exchange and attainment of various positions differing from those of the parents, has encompassed certain phases, which overall form two completely contrary trends.

The first phase was in the period up to 1986 and consisted in decreased mobility, closure of the groups, and decreasing equality of chances for attaining positions. This was an elitist society with an increasing hardening of the structures and more of inter-group thresholds and barriers to mobility; were it not for the turning point in 1989, this trend would have continued, but hardly for very long, as these social inequalities were increasingly impeding the

Figure 20.
The inequality of chances in inheriting by years





Figure 21.
Dynamics of the general index of inequality of chances



social and economic development of the country and would eventually have led to social transformations even without the appearance of a Gorbachev: it is imperative in contemporary development (and in the development of civilization in general) for the free exchange between all categories in the social-group structure to grow.

The second trend is typical for the last decade of the period we are considering and encompasses the time of „perestroika“ in our country (1986–1990), as well as the subsequent transformation of the system (1990–1997). The basic element here is the significant decrease of the level of inequality of chances (see the graph): the index values drop by nearly a half – from 0,395 points for 1986 to 0,205 points for 1997; importantly the decrease traces a nearly straight line for these three points in time (with an intermediate point in 1990).

There is a direct proportion between decrease of these inequalities and the time elapsed since the end of socialism, marked by changes toward democracy, openness, and market society. The important thing here is that the trend of the previous twenty years of „real socialism“ in Bulgaria has changed radically, which shows the presence of certain radical transformations of the mechanisms of exchange of individuals between social groups and indicates the attainment of different social positions from those of the parents, proving that the two structures, both in the period of socialism and during the transformation of the system, have typical features of social-structural inequality that differ one from the other; the latter of the two is marked by a

movement toward normalization and free interflow between groups, which, in turn, indicate the presence of an integrative, efficient inter-generational mobility.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion I feel it is necessary to discuss first of all some unusual characteristics in the group of officials in leadership positions; I will then trace the main directions of mobility processes and the change in the social-group structure in the period of change of the political and economic system.

The special attention focused on the group of officials in leadership positions is provoked by deviations from the general tendencies and also by the fact that for the first time in such studies we have a separate group that encompasses the top ranks of the political, state, economic and social pyramids. The concrete analysis shows that the lowest degree of inheritance of social position is in this group, together with the greatest openness and the least degree of stratification. On the other hand common sense and practical experience give us reasons to expect the reverse. What are the causes for these irregularities? I would like to address these questions here.

One of the causes is that the sample failed to represent the group thoroughly. In the period before this survey, the Bulgarian Communist Party/Bulgarian Socialist Party carried on a consistent strategy of concealing and scattering its cadres in other groups. Hence a considerable part of the party apparatus, which used to be an integral element of the nomenclature, could not be captured by our methods. We should also consider that part of these people consciously concealed their connection with the nomenclature, which was quite easy to accomplish in such surveys. Moreover our sample was based on census lists dating from 1985, which were least reliable concerning the top-ranks, because the regime would limit in various ways information about its cadres.

Ultimately this group cannot be reflected in the sample; part of it concealed itself in the category of specialists. This could not fail to affect the concrete results. However difficult and risky such estimates might be, I believe this group actually encompasses about

5–6 % of the occupied persons (in the study the percentage is 2,6). The low degree of self-reproduction of this group is additionally due to the fact that members of the political nomenclature were categorized under the professions they once had before beginning their careers in the apparatus (for instance a top-rank party leader like Stanko Todorov was a „tailor“), and not as representatives of a specific group of „managers“; in this way their children formally were considered to be of working class or rural origin.

The desire to present one's origin in a more favorable light before public opinion had something to do with it. Which leads us to the next important cause: practice (including the results of sociological survey) has shown that the representatives of this group are generally the most skillful and cunning, the best able to cope with practical matters: they have a rich experience in struggles between coteries and in intrigues, but also in filling out all kinds of information sheets, reports, etc., which generally determines their greater skill, compared with other groups, in presenting information about themselves in a most favorable light with regard to concrete public expectations (they were even more motivated to do so in the concrete historical circumstances at the time). As a result of all this, the information about this group is the least reliable compared with that on other social groups. Hence there is not much ground for drawing serious conclusions based on these data.

Next let us consider the question of the trends, direction, and size of social mobility in the transition period. Extrapolation on these matters at a time of radical transformations of society is, to say the least, very difficult and more or less risky. Conclusions on these questions can only come at the highest level of sociological analyses; they are a measure of the erudition and courage of the researcher. I would like to outline these trends in tracing their link to the changes in social structure. Part of the changes is already a reality.

Their beginning goes back to a time – far before the fall of the disruption of the regime in 1989 – when the communist party elite began to amass capitals abroad. With the issuing of Edict 56 the road was cleared purposefully for turning the ruling crust of the party into a new capitalist class. In this way began the internal capitalization of this stratum, but wider circles could now take part

in the process. In the last two years this process has developed in geometric progression: a concealed relentless privatization is going on, behind which is concealed the former nomenclature.

If followed through to the end, the process will result in the formation of new monopolies, this time capitalist ones. In this way the nomenclature and the former secret service and police apparatus will be at the core of the new upper bourgeoisie. Part of the party apparatus quickly „took cover“ after 1989 in specialist professions: it found itself obliged to begin some kind of normal work. Another part of the nomenclature, perhaps the largest (officials in the economy, the army, the police, and the judiciary) remained basically intact (unlike their counterparts in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia); this fact is and will continue to be a major obstacle to changes and transformation of society.

The other basic social stratum that may be expected to fill in the ranks of the upper bourgeoisie are the former private entrepreneurs of socialist times and certain categories of people occupied in commerce and the service sphere, people who already had amassed considerable money and property under the previous regime. Now their resources have multiplied thanks to the ideal conditions that emerged for speculative business. The third main social source for the formation of this group is marginal groups, criminals the upper ranks of whom possess millions in Western currency.

The listed categories will also fill the ranks of the middle and lower bourgeoisie as part of the middle strata, but they have greater chances than other people for attaining the level of the new upper bourgeoisie.

The former socialist intelligentsia will undergo particularly drastic changes. These changes began with the growing unemployment among specialists, embracing several social professional categories of this large group, especially engineering and technology specialists, many professions in the humanities, philologies other than Western languages, and the arts. There will apparently be decreasing demand for these professions. This is due to the circumstances that in the previous conditions an excessive number of such specialists were trained, far more than the rational needs of the economy warranted.

But their loss of status is also due to the prolonged duration of

the crisis; years will have to pass before the intelligentsia recovers its old status. Part of these professions, together with physicians, lawyers, journalists and other such will form the free market of intellectual labour and the liberal professions (which have always been very close to unemployment). Another part will continue to fill the ranks of emigrants and unemployed. The first category is the most problematic, for its eventual retraining in most cases amounts to a lowering of qualification, and many of these people have no other skills than the ones exercised in their past professions.. They will also fill the ranks of the new peasant class, of hired specialists, and of manual workers.

Another important element in the change of the professional structure of the intelligentsia is the beginning formation of the group of managers. Out of the circles of the former specialists the largest share will be that of the engineering and technological specialist, economists, and legal experts. But at present the manager stratum is formed mostly by the people in positions of „leadership“ and the former private entrepreneurs (in the initial stage of development of private capital the owner will also be the manager). The intelligentsia is already contributing its share in the formation of the small and middle entrepreneur class, especially in the form of publishing houses; translation firms, firms for training in foreign languages and other skills, etc. For the rest of the intelligentsia, remaining in the relative security of state employment, its social and especially material status will continue to decrease. State patronage will continue to diminish and will be replaced by new branches in the form of joint stock ownership and later on by purely private business.

As for the classical form of working class, there are several trends emerging with regard to this category.

Firstly, the working class will continue to be one of the most vulnerable (together with specialists) to unemployment; this is the group that will bear the brunt of the transition.

Secondly, overall I expect this group will shrink, at first at the expense of its skilled strata, and later at the expense of its low-skilled components. The younger and more resourceful will be engaged in the tertiary sector, which has already grown considerably (this trend is expected to continue in the next few years).

Thirdly, quite a few workers and technicians have so far successfully undertaken private business; it appears they will become part of the category of small and middle owners. And last, with the advance of privatization, the qualification division among worker, which is one of the basic ones, will be replaced by the division into sectors, which will lead in the next ten years to strong differentiation especially in the material status of workers, those in the private sector eventually attaining more advantageous position.

Perhaps the most dramatic changes of all have taken place in the Bulgarian rural world. The gradual transformation of the pseudo-cooperative agriculture into farming entails a change in the demographic, professional, educational and social structure of the peasant population. Villagers will attract able-bodied workers from all other groups, including highly skilled non-manual specialists (some of whom will have left their former categories and moved to villages not for lack of alternative but by preference). Of course this will be more typical for people living in smaller towns nearer to the respective village. As a whole this group will grow in the next years and on the average will get younger, better educated and far more enterprising.

All these processes, described in terms of social mobility, imply a considerable increase in the size and intensity of mobility in Bulgaria. These structural changes will naturally be connected with high structural mobility, but on the other hand the new conditions of the market economy will give considerably greater opportunities for success in new professions than were possible before; this in turn will lead to a growing circulatory mobility.

The latter is performing the function of a safety valve for letting out tension and compensating for deprivation accumulated in the social groups towards the end of the totalitarian period. With the advance of structural reforms and privatization, these processes will have rather positive social-psychological implications. (studies of the social-psychological dimensions of the processes of social mobility are inexistent in Bulgarian sociology and are a challenging new field for research).

Finally, during the socialist period the mobility in Bulgaria depended mostly on the structural changes (they were greatest in the beginning of the period), and with their decline it too decreased

considerably. The considerable growth of circulation mobility for 1997, accompanied by a decrease in structural mobility, reveals the unused potential of social mobility in the preceding period and is an indicator that the obstacles to mobility have decreased (at least the previous obstacles; new ones are emerging now). The openness of groups and of the overall structure can be estimated as relatively high. It was lowest in the period of most intense crisis of socialism, the mid 1980s, and has been growing ever since 1990, reaching a maximum for the non-manual groups in 1997.

In terms of the functions of mobility we can say that during the socialist period mobility performed a structure-forming function and performed it well, while its efficiency function and integrative function could not perform normally. During the 1990s we see these latter functions become activated, but there is a genuine risk and signs that they may once again be blocked (I am referring to usurpation, monopolization, decreasing prospects for education due to the growing price of education).

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The authors have cited the following pages:

CASES	
Adamski.....	6
Allardt.....	41
Andorka.....	41
Ash.....	9
Atanassov.....	24, 36
Bauman.....	18, 42
Bobeva.....	39
Boudon.....	50
Bourdieu.....	29
Charvat.....	50, 57, 58, 75
Dahrendorf.....	9
Dimitrov.....	19, 24, 26, 27, 36, 37, 39, 43, 61
Djilas.....	10
Domanski.....	40, 85, 86, 87
Fereira.....	14, 15
Ferge.....	43
Filipov.....	38
Fish.....	16
Gazho.....	38
Geremek.....	17
Giddens.....	49
Glass.....	85, 86
Goldthorpe.....	27, 49
Gospodinov.....	38
Grabowska.....	6
Hankin.....	22
Harcha.....	48
Harsa.....	43
Harvat.....	37
Janicka.....	45, 83
Katsarski.....	16
Kolosi.....	24, 39
Konchalovsky.....	10
Kostova.....	38
Lecz.....	37
Lendel.....	10
Livio.....	40
Mach.....	6, 27, 33, 40, 50
Mannheim.....	35
Markov.....	40
Marx.....	44
Mashiyakh.....	36
Meyer.....	40
Mihailov.....	20
Mills.....	27
Minkov.....	36
Mitev.....	38
Oshavkov.....	36
Ossipov.....	37
Ossowski.....	35
Pankowski.....	6
Parchev.....	40
Parkin.....	49
Petkov.....	32, 36, 37, 40, 53, 56
Polyakova.....	40
Porter.....	30
Raychev.....	44
Rogoff.....	50, 60, 85, 86
Sawinski.....	39, 85, 86, 87
Shubkin.....	38
Simeonov.....	16
Slomczynski.....	40, 52
Soros.....	10
Szacki.....	6
Sztompka.....	21
Tilkidjiev.....	44
Tocqueville.....	35
Todorova.....	40
Touraine.....	10
Treiman.....	11
Tuma.....	40
Weber.....	42, 49
Wesolowski.....	27, 28, 40, 41, 48, 50
Wnuk-Lipinski.....	6, 20
Yasuda.....	50, 83

Zagorski K.....6, 30, 41 52, 53, 75
Zagorski W.....6
Zlatkov....11, 14, 28, 37, 38,

ANEX

**Anex Table .
Intergenerational Mobility Table: 1977.**

Respo n-dents	Profe s- sionals	Cleri- cal	Work- ers	Peas- ants	Pri- vate busi- ness	Total
Fathers						
Profes- sionals	45,6- 6,3	29,9- 3,0	20,1- 0,6	3,3-0,2	1,1-1,3	100,0- 1,5
Clerical	28,7- 27,9	30,4- 21,2	36,7- 7,4	3,6-1,7	0,6-4,7	100,0- 10,4
Workers	9,4- 32,8	16,2- 40,8	63,8- 46,6	9,3- 15,9	1,3- 39,6	100,0- 37,5
Peasants	7,1- 27,2	10,3- 28,1	46,0- 36,5	35,4- 66,4	1,2- 39,1	100,0- 40,8
Private business	6,2-5,8	10,5- 6,9	46,4- 8,9	34,9- 15,8	2,0- 15,3	100,0- 9,8
Total -	10,7- 100,0	14,9- 100,0	51,4- 100,0	10,7- 100,0	1,2- 100,0	100,0

Anex – Table .
Intergenerational Mobility Table: 1986.

Respo n-dents	Profe s- sionals	Cleri- cal	Work- ers	Peas- ants	Pri- vate busi- ness	Total
Fathers						
Profes- sionals	56,6– 30,0	20,7– 4,8	22,1– 1,8	0,5–0,1	–	100,0– 4,1
Clerical	21,9– 25,4	42,9– 22,0	32,1– 5,8	2,9–1,2	0,2–3,0	100,0– 9,1
Workers	5,7– 25,6	19,5– 38,2	68,4– 47,6	6,1–9,2	0,2– 12,1	100,0– 35,1
Peasants	2,8– 17,0	11,6– 31,4	43,8– 42,1	41,0– 85,4	0,8– 62,2	100,0– 48,4
Private business	5,0–2,0	20,2– 3,6	41,2– 2,7	29,2– 4,1	4,4– 27,7	100,0– 3,3
Total –	7,9– 100,0	17,8– 100,0	50,4– 100,0	23,2– 100,0	0,6– 100,0	100,0

Anex – Table .
Intergenerational Mobility Table: 1990.

Respo n-dents	Profe s- sionals	Cleri- cal	Work- ers	Peas- ants	Pri- vate busi- ness	Total
Fathers						
Profes- sionals	55,1– 28,1	25,7– 8,1	15,4– 2,7	2,8–1,7	0,9– 10,5	100,0 8,0
Clerical	32,7– 19,5	44,2– 16,2	21,1– 4,7	2,0–1,4	–	100,0 9,4
Workers	12,5– 29,8	30,7– 45,0	51,0– 42,3	4,5– 12,7	1,3– 68,5	100,0 37,3
Peasants	7,9– 22,6	17,2– 30,4	50,1– 50,3	24,5– 83,4	0,3– 21,0	100,0 45,0
Private business	–	25,0– 0,3	37,5– 0,3	37,5– 0,8	–	100,0 0,3
Total –	15,6– 100,0	25,5– 100,0	44,9– 100,0	13,3– 100,0	0,7– 100,0	100,0

Anex – Table .
Intergenerational Mobility Table: 1997.

Respo n-dents	Profe s- sionals	Cleri- cal	Work- ers	Peas- ants	Pri- vate busi- ness	Total
Fathers						
Profes- sionals	41,1– 32,3	28,7– 11,9	16,3– 4,6	0,9–0,9	13,2– 22,7	100,0 11,6
Clerical	21,5– 20,7	32,3– 16,3	36,7– 12,8	3,2–4,7	6,3– 13,3	100,0 14,2
Workers	10,6– 28,0	27,8– 38,8	48,7– 46,9	5,7– 23,6	7,1– 41,3	100,0 39,2
Peasants	9,0– 15,9	26,0– 24,0	41,7– 26,5	18,8– 50,9	4,5– 17,3	100,0 26,0
Private business	5,1–3,0	28,3– 9,0	41,4– 9,1	21,2– 19,8	4,0– 5,3	100,0 8,9
Total –	14,8– 100,0	28,1– 100,0	40,8– 100,0	9,6– 100,0	6,8– 100,0	100,0

TABLES AND FIGURES

FIGURES

Figure 1. Changes in differences between neighbour structures in the period 1967–1997.....	63
Figure 2. Dynamism of main parameters of social mobility..	65
Figure 3. Vertical social mobility (%)*	67
Figure 4. Dynamism of social origin: non- manual – manual	68
Figure 5 Dynamism of social origin of all researched agregates.....	69
Figure 6 Dynamism of social origin: professionals.....	69
Figure 7 Dynamism of social origin: workers.....	72
Figure 8 Dynamism of social origin: peasants.....	73
Figure 9 Dynamism of social origin: proprietors.....	74
Figure 10 Dynamism of social origin: proprietors.....	75
Figure 11. Vertical social mobility (%)*	76
Figure 12. Intensity of movement: professionals.....	77
Figure 13. Intensity of movement: clerical.....	78
Figure 14. Intensity of movement: workers.....	79
Figure 15. Intensity of movement: peasants.....	80

Tables

Table 1. Changes in social structure.....	60
Table 2. Indexes of Similarity of Social Structures.....	63
Table 3. Dynamism of Main Parameters Of Social Mobility 1977–1997.....	66

Anex – Tables

Content

Preface.....	
Chapter I.....	9
Peculiarities of Determination of the System	
Transformation in Bulgaria.....	
Chapter II.....	24
Theoretical- Methodological Problems of the Study of	
Social Mobility and Methodological Premises of this	
Study.....	
Chapter III.....	59
Dynamism of Changes in Social Structure and Social	
Mobility During the Period 1977–1997.....	
Chapter IV.....	82
Interactions between Changes in Social Structure and	
Social Mobility Processes.....	
Conclusions.....	
Bibliografy.....	
Anex.....	
Tables and figures.....	
Figures.....	