Bulgarian Cuisine | |
In our daily news bulletin we present a good deal of information concerning the initiatives of the Bulgarian diplomacy; in most cases, this information is based on the more or less pro-governmental newspapers. In order to get a more realistic idea of the actual results achieved by the Bulgarian diplomacy, it is necessary to make a more objective review of its performance.
First of all, we should point out the lack of whatever official reports about the real difficulties in the Bulgarian foreign policy, as well as about the possibilities of overcoming them. In the information released by the Foreign Ministry, prevailing are some most general and largely meaningless cliches liable, at best, to ambiguous interpretation.
So far, during 1998 there has been no 'breakthrough' and none of the issues important for Bulgaria has been settled. This is largely true of Bulgaria's strategic aim - Bulgarian NATO membership. Judging by the meetings of the top Bulgarian officials with their counterparts from NATO member countries, one might conclude that Bulgaria will undoubtedly qualify for the second wave of the enlargement to be decided in April in Washington. At the same time, the information coming from some well-known NATO experts suggests that the 'second wave' will be postponed indefinitely. And the latter opinion is quite realistic, because the reforms in Roumania have went wrong, and Bulgaria has failed to meet a number of crucial criteria without which her candidature will hardly be considered in earnest. For example, until now Bulgaria has not ratified the CE Frame Convention on Minorities and has not signed the basic agreement with Macedonia. These two conditions have been persistently concealed from the public, although a debate on the Frame Convention has begun, but one out of the context of Bulgarian membership in NATO.
The negotiations with Macedonia are now in a dead-lock and the Bulgarian government is obviously going to wait for the election results in Macedonia and the formation of a new, more concession-prone cabinet. However, the likelihood of the formation of a government which would be more willing to make appreciable concessions is insignificant. Lately, the Bulgarian side launched the idea of 'open borders' with Macedonia, and the reaction of the Macedonian side was to invent a new problem - that of the 'stolen Macedonian cultural and historical heritage'.
As regards the Kosovo crisis, Bulgaria set forth a good
initiative which made it possible to reconcile the apprehensions of all the
Balkan countries. The hope that Bulgaria will be able to play an active part in
this respect has rapidly disappeared after the suggested - by the Foreign
Ministry - continuation of this initiative through further exchange of
positions (in written form) in order to specify the compromises each country was
ready to make. There are good reasons to characterize this approach as an
obvious lack of professionalism, taking into account German Defence Minister
Volker Ruhe's declaration that the possibilities for the small countries to
participate in the settlement of the Kosovo crisis are insignificant, in so far
as the large nations can do nothing. Ever since, although the crisis in Kosovo
has been incessantly analysed and covered by the media, there has been no
clarity as to what Bulgaria's further steps will be. It is not clear whether she
is going to take part in NATO operations, or will refrain from immediate
involvement; whether she will lend humanitarian assistance or only logistic
support. [The English language translation of this text was made on 24 October -
by then Bulgaria had already a definite position on this issue - the National
Assembly had voted a declaration in support of the government's decision to
permit access of NATO aircraft to the Bulgarian air space.
The question of the formation of a Balkan Rapid Reaction
Corps and the character of its mission, is similarly vague. For the time
being, the media are discussing only the issue of whether the headquarters
and the commandment of this corps should be based in Plovdiv. There is
absolute silence on the subject of the nature of the actions of these troops
and the possible consequences for Bulgaria.
A good number of summit meetings between Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish and Roumanian Heads of State or Government have taken place. However, none of the important problems with Greece has been solved; the issue of the second bridge on the Danube has not been settled either.
Quite uncertain is also the governmental position on EU's critical report on Bulgaria based on the 'witch hunting' witnessed in the public administration and, especially, on the dismissal of a great number of diplomats, as well as on the censorship in the media and the attempts to subjugate the judiciary system. For the present, the UDF parliamentary group rejects the assessments of the report and its underlying information.
A unanimously high evaluation was given to President Stoyanov's visit to Moscow and the warming up of the Bulgarian-Russian relations. His meetings, however, did not lead to the signing of an official document. The visit had been organized without any serious preparatory work on the part of the experts of both sides as is the relevant international practice of many years. The work of the experts in the joint economic committee and in various other spheres is yet to be done. The practical dimensions of President Stoyanov's 'breakthrough' in Bulgaria's relations with Russia are wrapped in obscurity.
We cannot help mentioning that since 1990 Bulgaria's relations with the Arab world countries have followed an ever declining course and are now at a freezing point. This is especially strongly felt in the sphere of commercial and economic relations, where the fall is most drastic. There has been no change whatsoever during the past months of 1998; in fact, things have come to a joint protest by the ambassadors of the Arab countries in Sofia provoked by Bulgaria's declared neutral position in the United Nations on the Israeli-Arab conflict. The Bulgarian position on this issue differs from that of the EU - which supported the Arab side - and this has been underlined in the protest note of the Arab ambassadors to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry. A telling example of the current state of the Bulgarian-Arab relations is Syria's refusal to give approval to the government-assigned candidate for ambassador in Damascus, an unprecedented act in the relations with the Arab countries.
Insufficient are also the efforts made by the Bulgarian diplomacy in the sphere of Bulgaria's relations with the countries from the Caucasian region and Central Asia, although the restoration of the 'Silk Way' is one of the most discussed topics in the mass media. For the time being, only President Stoyanov has been actively engaged in the issue of Bulgaria's participation in the TRACECA project (the transport corridor Europe -Caucasus - Asia).
The conclusion one can make from the above-mentioned facts is that the Bulgarian public needs much more reliable information about the real issues in the Bulgarian foreign policy and the way these issues are being resolved, because this affects the destiny of all Bulgarian citizens. It is time to abandon the meaningless cliches from the totalitarian times and the propagandist reports proclaiming that everything is smooth and easy.
21 September, 1998, Sofia
