Over the past one and a half years the Bulgarian-Russian relations have gone through some dramatic moments and have been a matter of recurrent violent confrontation on a national plane. The Bulgarian political elite has demonstrated again its major failing following Bulgaria's Liberation - being once more divided into 'Philes' and 'Phobes". This persistent fault has stemmed from its inability to clearly formulate the nation's interest on the basis of an objective, sober, multiplex analysis - without inevitably bounding up its realization with some foreign power or other. This holds true of both 'Philes' and 'Phobes'.

On the other hand, after 1991 Russia's policy in the Balkans has been marked by a great deal of inconsistency. It has become clear enough that Russia is willing to retain her influence in this region, but too much irresolution has been manifested as to the particular methods for its implementation. At the same time, the Russian political, economic, commercial and financial resources making for her active presence have been growing smaller and smaller.
After the UDF government took office, the Bulgarian-Russian relations were demarcated by Prime Minister Ivan Kostov in a statement defining them as directly dependent on the development of Russia-NATO relations. Treating Bulgaria's relations with Russia as a function of the latter's relations with NATO fully corresponds to the foreign policy priorities, tasks and objectives formulated by the UDF. The weak point of this position lies in the fact that in doing so Bulgaria becomes dependent on NATO in a way similar to her dependence on the USSR prior to 1990. The strict implementation of this doctrine will be a repetition of the black-and-white foreign policy approach, of the senseless devotion and adherence to the rank of the most loyal satellite already known in the Bulgarian history.

Today, one year after Ivan Kostov made this statement, we can say that actually Bulgaria's relations with both Russia and NATO did not follow his scenario.

In the late 1997 and early 1998,  the Bulgarian-Russian relations represented a harrowing uphill work. It is useless to mention once again all the offensive acts of the Bulgarian side as regards a Great Power. It is a noteworthy fact that apart from the description of 'black ingratitude', Moscow did not react to these acts in accordance with the Bulgarian saying 'I wouldn't be mad if I'm boot-kicked, but I'd really go mad if kicked by a torn pigskin sandal', rather trying to take advantage of Bulgaria's economic and raw-material dependence on Russia. Thus, in a most natural way the bilateral commercial and economic relations were drastically limited. Especially aggravated were these relations during the gas talks, when it became absolutely clear that neither side benefited from the violent confrontation. Anyway, the much-acclaimed agreement on the gas supplies and gas transit has been reached, and it is the best and most promising one ever signed by Bulgaria since 1989. It provides for Bulgaria's becoming the central gas distributor for all the Balkan countries. This agreement is Prime Minister Kostov's big stroke and for the time being the only one of the present-day politicians which gives some hope that the next Bulgarian generations will have at least this resource which will facilitate the paying out of the large foreign debt they are to inherit. The agreement was achieved after Ivan Kostov changed the negotiating tactics. He replaced the 'win-lose' approach with a 'win-win' one. Both sides abandoned the idea of obtaining maximum profits and adopted the average-mutual-benefit  approach instead. The agreement proved the validity of the most prominent tendency in today's international relations - the rapidly growing interdependence.

At present Bulgaria is able to offer for sale on the foreign political market three things - internal stability, a policy aimed at stabilizing the Balkans, and a very advantageous geostrategic position. Of these three items only the last one is a constant and it can only bring good profits to Bulgaria if a specific and well-balanced policy is pursued.
By signing the gas agreement, Russia became the only state among the Great Powers that recognized, de facto and de jure, Bulgaria's important geostrategic position. It will be very good if the United States, too, makes the same admission by supporting the AMBO project for the Bourgas - Flyora transport link. But even if this project is realized, it is much more likely for the oil to come from Novorossiysk than from Supsa.

The gas agreement was a clear indication that the two countries were in need of a qualitative change in their relations. A breakthrough was essential and it was achieved by President Stoyanov during his visit to Moscow.
We have to point out that after the meeting with President Clinton in Washington, President Stoyanov repeated more than once that Bulgaria's wish to join NATO is not directed against Russia and the Russian interests. These statements introduced certain new nuances and further specified the approach already defined by Kostov and applied in Bulgaria's contacts with Moscow. Kostov himself declared in the National Assembly that  'we consider Russia to be our strategic partner".  Another thing that made the breakthrough possible was Stoyanov's appeal to eliminate the 'useless swaggering and overshooting'.

During Stoyanov's visit to Moscow the question of Bulgaria's integration into NATO was never raised, which showed that Russia had already swallowed the reality and it would not make problems in the bilateral relations. The Bulgarian side put forward a number of important commercial-economic and financial issues waiting to be resolved and none of them was denied by Russia. It is a different question when and how they will be settled. Most probably this will become possible during a future summit meeting between the prime ministers. There the dimensions of the breakthrough accomplished by President Stoyanov will become evident. Kostov expressed his willingness to meet Kiriyenko twice by the end of 1998, but given the present situation in Russia, it will be a great success if even one meeting with Primakov takes place.

A new trial for the bilateral relations became the Kosovo crisis. There was a genuine risk for Bulgaria, in case of an unbalanced and rigid policy on her part, of bringing her relations with Russia back to the freezing point.
There are grounds to believe that during the second half of 1998 Bulgaria began to rediscover the opportunities likely to openup in the context of her good relations with not only Russia, but China, India, and the Arab countries. The new accents in Bulgaria's foreign political orientation challenge in no way the meaning and significance of her accession to NATO and the EU. This integration has no other judicious alternative. What is more, neither the United States, not NATO follow a policy of isolating Russia or 'bringing her to her knees'. It is well realized that without Russia it is impossible to attain lasting peace and security in both Europe and the Balkans.

We can only hope that with the continuous improvement of Bulgaria's relations with Russia and the East, the Bulgarian politicians will be able to go beyond their traditional one-sided orientation and commitment. The national interests and goals, as well as the advantageous geostrategic position, cannot not be fulfilled looking only towards the West. Bulgaria may profit most if she succeeds in playing the bridge between the West and the East. Bulgaria's unbalanced orientation to NATO and the EU alone will turn this country into a vegetating, marginal, buffer state. Besides, it may safely be said that in the next 7-8 years Bulgaria will not be able to make the technological innovations which will allow her to launch a large range of competitive goods on the Western market. At the same time, it is vitally important for Bulgaria to rapidly achieve a high economic growth able to provide jobs for a vast number of the unemployed.

A more balanced and flexible policy will suit better small Bulgaria, situated between the East and the West, although the Bulgarian politicians have no experience whatsoever in this respect.

The meanders in the Bulgarian-Russian relations after 1989 have shown that both countries were unprepared to respond to the challenges of the sudden changes. Both sides often reacted hastily and unwisely. Stoyanov's successful visit has demonstrated that the national interests should be defined plainly and carefully. It was made clear in Moscow that from that point on the Russian influence in Bulgaria would be immediately dependent on how far Russia reckons with the Bulgarian interests. The more Russia takes into account the Bulgarian interests, the greater the Russian influence in Bulgaria will be. This will inevitably reflect on the political sphere, though it is difficult to measure the exact scope of this impact.

Now it is probably unnecessary to brag too much about Bulgaria's small dependence on Russia assuming that the crisis will hardly affect Bulgaria. It will be better for us to do something to help. Do something small, but meaningful, actuated by mere human solidarity rather than looking for the Slav or Orthodox background. The Russians have done that for us Bulgarians before. The EU have already declared they are going to provide foodstaff aid.
 

                                                                                                 OMDA

1  December, 1998, Sofia