Over a year now, each step of the government in the foreign policy sphere, and much of its efforts in the home policy domain, has sought conformity with the country's desire to achieve Bulgarian accession to NATO and EU. Therefore, the question of whether Bulgaria meets the major membership criteria is justified from the point of view of assessing her real chances for admission.

One of the most important NATO membership requirements to the former socialist countries is that the respective aspirant country should have signed the basic political agreements with all its neighbour countries settling the bilateral issues of conflict. The Republic of Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia are the only neighbours with whom Bulgaria does not have such agreements. But while the signing of an agreement with Yugoslavia has not been asked by NATO and EU so far, the requirement for concluding a treaty with Macedonia becomes increasingly imperative.

The European Union set this requirement as early as 1993, under the "Baladure plan" at first, and later as an official membership criterion.

It is absurd to believe at all that, given the 25-year long inability of the EU, NATO and the U.S. to find an acceptable solution to the Greece-Turkey conflict, they will be inclined to admit to membership another Balkan country that has some unsettled problems with any other Balkan country.

So, the issue of the basic Bulgarian agreement with Macedonia, expected  to be signed by the end of 1998, comes to the fore once again, because as early as January 1999 NATO is going to decide whether there will be a second wave of enlargement, and if the decision is positive - which countries will be nominated in April in Washington. There are no signs whatsoever of a "breakthrough" in the "language controversy" with Macedonia, and the Bulgarian side has refused German and U.S. mediation in this issue. There appear to be no chances of a radical change in the situation after the elections in Macedonia - Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov has confirmed this. The Bulgarian side publicly launched the "open borders" idea which was received by allegations that the Bulgarians are occupiers and marauders. Naturally, the Macedonian side is well aware of the fact that Bulgaria is in urgent need of a basic bilateral agreement and, therefore, its position gets increasingly stiff. Given these facts, we can make the following conclusions:

Ever since 1913 national catastrophes have been brought about by following a bitterly familiar scenario:  one of all the Macedonian organizations makes an emotional appeal, which is followed by a national euphoria about the affiliation of the Bulgarian brothers in Macedonia. Next comes the war and its well-known outcome. The Macedonian organizations begin to multiply, to quarrel, and finally to slaughter one another in a most barbarous way.

Without the basic agreement with Macedonia being signed there will be neither NATO, nor EU accession. It is perhaps needless to remind of the pronounced U.S. affinity to Macedonia, but we should necessarily remind the suppressed fact that during his visit to Moscow early this year President Gligorov signed a joint declaration with Yeltsin envisaging "joint preventive military action", without specifying the relevant pre-conditions and against whom it will be taken.

The idea of transparent borders is a very good one; however, given the present situation, it will remain unrealizable. It is even possible that this initiative will pour a good amount of fresh grist to Kiro Gligorov's mill - he keeps repeating that Bulgaria represents the largest threat to the independence and territorial integrity of Macedonia. NATO's suspicions about Bulgaria's real intentions might even get deeper and Holbrooke might make some new statements. As it is, the language controversy between the two countries is being observed with confusion and bewilderment, and is sometimes perceived as a kind of Balkan fancy. Our positions have largely lost ground since Romania, in order to qualify for NATO membership, signed its basic agreements with the Ukraine and Hungary, although she has much more difficult bilateral disputes to resolve than are those between Bulgaria and Macedonia.

To all this we should add the assumption that if the domestic situation in Macedonia becomes strongly unstable in consequence of actions undertaken by the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo or in Macedonia itself, then, in compliance with the Bulgarian commitments so far, Bulgaria will have to render active assistance to Kiro Gligorov - political, diplomatic, humanitarian, logistic, and, is necessary, military.

Maybe the Bulgarian political elite is soon going to reach the conclusion that the winning and most patriotic idea is the one leading Bulgaria to prosperity and welfare, rather than to collapse and a new national catastrophe. This time it could be the last one. In this respect, special attention deserves the idea of the spiritual unification of the Bulgarians at home and abroad within the framework of a united Europe. Its achievements may acquire practical implications within 10-15 years. The Bulgarian people are going to win the game provided during this period a stable economic growth and a high living standard are achieved in Bulgaria. Then it will be the Macedonian, and not the Bulgarian side that will ask transparent borders.
Second among the most important criteria for affiliation to NATO and the EU is to sign and ratify the Frame Convention on Minority Rights. In this field, some very hopeful changes in the government's course of behaviour might be seen. For a period of nearly one year it followed the policy of Zhan Videnov's cabinet involving an arrogant neglect of the requirements set and recommendations made by the Council of Europe (CE). It seems that at last there is awareness that we can join neither NATO nor the EU unless we have gone through the CE "purgatory". Gradually gaining ground is the understanding that the MRF is part of Bulgaria's face before the world - NATO, EU, the Arab world, and the Central Asian republics. The preference for Bulgaria will grow substantially if Bulgaria shows to this world her face with all its features, among them the MFR. Generally speaking, the chances for the Frame Convention to be signed by the end of this year, have grown considerably, and they will increase further, if there is consensus on an accompanying declaration stating that by the Convention's ratification Bulgaria does not grant collective rights to those Bulgarian citizens whose mother tongue and faith are different from the language and religion of the predominant population. And yet the most difficult step remains - to formulate and apply in Bulgaria the European attitude to the rest of the CE recommendations, an attitude requiring a new philosophy of government concerning the existing division of the Bulgarian nation.

It is necessary to look upon the present situation based on realities and point out that even if the Bulgarian side signs the key agreement with Macedonia, and ratifies the Frame Convention, etc. there will be no guarantee whatever that we shall be admitted to NATO membership with the second wave of enlargement. Romania's chances were very much reduced after the failed privatization and structural reform. By the end of 1998 it is hardly possible for Bulgaria to make some significant progress along this line. This may be expected to occur in February-March 1999. However, NATO will surely like to know what the situation in Bulgaria will be 2-3 months following the structural reform, when the expected number of unemployed people will rise to 500 thousand. We should add to this the disgraceful and shameful size of the average wages in Bulgaria as compared to these in the countries of the Visegrad three group. As long as the average monthly wage in Bulgaria remains below 350 U.S. dollars, there will be no talks with Bulgaria, but only lecturing and demands. So, a very likely situation to develop is that one in which Bulgaria remains an active participant in the Partnership for Peace initiative alone and will have only the right to consultations on the guarantees for the Bulgarian national security.

The actual benefit of our desire to be admitted to NATO and EU membership may prove to be much greater than initially expected. There are no signs thus far that the Bulgarian political elite will be able on its own to articulate and implement a new political philosophy and style of government by turning their back on those in use ever since the time of Stambolov. It is much more likely that significant changes will occur under the pressure of NATO, EU, CE and the IMF. The IMF has the largest capacity, as well as an immediate moral commitment. Because the IMF demanded the National Consensus Declaration and actively stimulated the formation of the reforms majority.