On March 19 the foreign ministers of Macedonia, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania signed their latest declaration on the Kosovo peace agreement. Albania and Yugoslavia were also invited, but they refused to attend the meeting noting that initiatives of this kind were pointless. There are sufficient grounds for such assertions. The Balkan initiatives were started by Foreign Minister Mikhailova in March 1998. Her initiative was launched as soon as it became clear that Greece had taken up the task of acting as mediator between Belgrade and Pristina. Until now, Yugoslavia has been willing to accept only Greek mediation. This attitude has not been approved by the United States and some of the West European great powers. Therefore the advent of the "Mikhailova initiative" was actively assisted by the Americans. Indeed, so many changes have been made by the Greek side in the text of the draft declaration proposed by Bulgaria that the document has been almost entirely transformed tending to become much more tolerant to Belgrade.

In any case the Balkan peace initiatives concerning Kosovo and the Balkans have been consistent in their aims:
1. They support NATO without ruling out the potential of the Contact Group of which Russia is a member.
2. They create the impression that the Balkan countries are also contributing to the maintenance of peace in the region.
3. They invariably tend to place Yugoslavia and Milosevic in isolation.
4. They invariably give warnings to the Yugoslavian government and Milosevic himself to accept NATO's peace plan. This does not seem to have strongly impressed Milosevic, having in mind that over the past year he has become a world champion in confronting warnings, threats and ultimatums.
5. They seek to ease in some measure the existing serious conflicts between the different Balkan countries (Turkey and Greece) and reconcile the different views (Bulgaria and Macedonia before their relations were settled).

Until now no Balkan initiative has led to any visible results or had any practical consequences. The great powers are very well aware of this fact, but nevertheless they keep supporting them and even describe them in superlatives. In this way one might believe that their political game enjoys general approval and support. The Balkan states, in turn, know very well they have been assigned only minor parts of supernumeraries, but still they have been engaged in a lot of propaganda clamouring in their respective countries. There has been a great deal of  pretended diplomatic peace-making activity of a kind seeking to form the impression that Bulgaria and Romania, for example, are important international and regional factors. In reality, everything depends on the U.S., NATO and Milosevic.  At the same time, the public has been persistently prepared to face the precise moment when Bulgaria is going to make its territory and infrastructure accessible to NATO for attacks against Serbia. In that moment people will be told that every possible move towards a negotiated peace deal has been made, but Milosevic has remained uncompromising.

Prime Minister Kostov is right to worry about the West's having no clear plan for action in case of a breakdown in the Kosovo peace negotiations. And the Paris talks have already failed. NATO's apprehensions about the effectiveness of the planned air strikes against Serbia have best been expressed by Henry Kissinger. He said that NATO wanted to launch air strikes against Serbia in order to be able to enter Kosovo and disarm the KLA Kosovar Albanians.

The doubts shared by the Bulgarian political parties concerning KLA's involvement in the Kosovo drama have been growing. The position of the BSP, which categorically opposes any form of engagement in the crisis, has been joined by the parliamentary group of the NSA. The Euroleft uphold only the idea of giving logistical support. The cabinet is merely waiting for NATO's specific demands in order to fulfil them. Yet, it may safely be said that in April 1999 Bulgaria will not be nominated for joining the second wave of NATO's enlargement.

One can understand the government in its efforts to rank Bulgaria among the victors, to avail of the advantages provided by the Partnership for Prosperity initiative launched by Solana, as well as to depend on a more favourable attitude on the part of the IMF and the World Bank leading to additional credits. However, the price of all this is unfathomable. If it means setting a time-bomb in the relations with Serbia, then what we need is wiser and well-considered action.

Kamen Minchev